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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Following the mandate of the ECOFIN Council conclusions and the work 
program of the Working Group on the Quality of Public Finances (QPFWG), 
this is the draft of the first joint EPC-EC Annual Report on Revenue Trends 
and Reforms of Tax Systems. Revenue systems play a key role for the 
efficient allocation and the distribution of resources, and are a fundamental 
determinant of the sustainability of public finances. Making European 
revenue systems more conducive to employment, growth and equity while 
insuring stable revenues are important policy objectives underpinning long-
term sustainability. Tax reforms that modify revenue systems in this direction 
are therefore an integral part of the Lisbon Strategy for Jobs and Growth and 
are key to assuring fiscal sustainability in the context of ageing populations. 
The consequences of the financial crisis will be deeply reflected in Member 
States' government revenues. Tax revenues from profit and capital income 
are likely to be severely reduced, but also revenues from labour and 
consumption taxes will subsequently negatively affected, as employment 
follows the cyclical downturn, wage growth slows down and consumption 
weakens. Finally, active fiscal stabilisation policies on the revenue side will 
also directly and indirectly (via their effects on economic activity) affect 
government revenues. 
Tax policies are important instruments Member States have at their disposal 
to counter the financial crisis and its impact on the real economy. Revenue 
systems play an important role as automatic stabilisers and are a key 
instrument for active counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Sound tax policies to 
revive the economy should combine cost-efficient fiscal stimulus with 
improvements of incentives to invest and to work. 
In terms of overall tax burden, a trend that emerges from the data is a 
renewed pick-up of the overall tax burden over recent years. The increase in 
the tax-to-GDP ratio slowed down in the 1980s before growing again more 
strongly in the 1990s. The total tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU peaked at the turn 
of the century before starting to decrease. The latest data, however, show a 
reverse in this downward trend. 
The analysis of the composition of tax revenue or ‘tax mix’ shows that the 
vast bulk of tax revenue raised in the EU, indeed more than 90 per cent, 
comes from three main sources: income taxes, taxes on goods and services, 
and social security contributions. With the caveat regarding the 
disentanglement of cyclical and structural components of the actual 
movements in mind, it appears fair to say that indirect taxes have slowly been 
gaining importance over recent years. At the same time, social security 
contributions have lost some importance, potentially reflecting the fact that 
governments have been trying to reduce the tax burden on labour. As regards 
direct taxes, there appears to be an upward movement as well, but this is 
more difficult to assess given the presence of pronounced cyclical effects. 
Tax revenues from environmental taxation have been falling slightly over 
recent years on average (in % of GDP), but their importance across Member 
States has been diverging since 2003. 
Revenue systems in the EU seem to be slowly converging, much as a result 
of individual and country-specific actions of Member States. There is 
increasing awareness that all Member States could benefit from increased 
13 
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communication, co-operation and co-ordination. In the years to come, 
Member States should cooperatively work together to achieve mutually 
beneficial outcomes in line with the June 2007 ECOFIN Council conclusions 
which reaffirmed the need for Member States to exchange information on 
current and planned tax reforms and their impact on growth and employment 
within existing procedures. (1)
Revenue systems can play an important part in the strong disincentives to 
take up work or to increase hours of work/effort levels in many Member 
States. In a number of Member States taxes and social security contributions 
contribute to substantial inactivity traps, unemployment traps, or low wage 
traps. These Member States need to consider how to design sound tax 
reforms to reduce these traps in view of their impact on employment. This 
may be partly achieved by shifting the tax burden to alternative tax bases, 
such as environmental or property taxes, or by a better balance of the tax 
burden across the tax schedule. 
Member States need to continue their efforts to implement rate-cut cum base-
broadening reforms taking into account their policy objectives and 
sustainability. However, they also need to be more aware of the limits of base 
broadening reforms. Taxation of firms, whether incorporated or not 
incorporated, needs to sufficiently allow for efficiency-enhancing provisions 
to avoid excessive distortions of firms' financing, operating and investment 
decisions. 
Tax competition for mobile tax bases affects the design of revenue systems. 
Member States may be called to consider how such competition may be set in 
an appropriate framework to benefit from the healthy aspects of such 
competition, while limiting the downside risk of an accelerated race to the 
bottom which puts additional pressure on immobile tax bases with the 
associated efficiency losses. 
(1) (ECOFIN) Council conclusions of June 5, 2007 (Council document 10319/07). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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Based on the mandate of the ECOFIN Council, the 
work program of the Working Group on the 
Quality of Public Finances (EPC-QPFWG attached 
to the Economic Policy Committee (EPC)) has 
identified the efficiency of tax systems as a key 
issue for further work. The EPC-QPFWG has 
decided that this work should, among others, take 
the form of an annual report on revenue system 
developments and tax reforms in order to gauge 
better the development of the revenue side of 
government budgets and to improve the basis for 
informed policy choices and increased quality of 
public finances in Europe. 
The joint EC-EPC Annual Report on Revenues 
(ARR) is prepared by the Commission (jointly by 
DG ECFIN and DG TAXUD) and the EPC-
QPFWG. It builds on the substantial work carried 
out by the Commission services, such as 
assessments of the budgetary implications of tax 
reforms, analyses on the key role of revenue 
systems for the sustainability of public finances 
and the studies considering their effects on 
employment, growth and equity and their 
contribution to the achievement of environmental 
policy objectives. The report is for the most part 
descriptive. The intention is not to offer specific 
tax policy recommendations, but simply to 
spotlight the most recent trends and to present 
major tax reforms undertaken by a number of 
Member States. The report does not aim to provide 
a comprehensive overview of the structure of 
revenue systems in the EU. With the Annual 
Report on Taxation Trends prepared by DG 
TAXUD and Eurostat (cf. European Commission 
(2008a)) a comprehensive overview of the level 
and structure of taxation is already available on a 
yearly basis. (2)  The ARR focuses more on 
specific aspects and developments that are 
considered to be particularly relevant for growth, 
employment and equity and that are key to the 
Lisbon Strategy for Jobs and Growth and the 
Strategy's implementation. In addition, it considers 
those aspects of revenue systems that are important 
for macroeconomic stability. These comprise the 
role of revenue systems to stabilise the economy in 
the face of adverse shocks, as well as the medium 
(2) Box 4.1 in section 4 provides an overview of significant 
recent tax reforms that have been carried out in Member 
States. It does not, however, presents an exhaustive list of 
all tax changes in all Member States.  
and long term sustainability of public finances. 
Being more selective in topics, the analysis allows 
to concentrate on the key developments of 
European revenue systems and to provide 
economic analysis of various tax policy options 
that have been enacted or are being considered in 
the Member States. 
The report pursues several objectives. First, it 
identifies the way European revenue systems are 
evolving and the related fiscal, economic, and 
social challenges policy makers are facing in their 
pursuit of improved revenue systems. It describes 
the tax reforms that have recently been carried out, 
and what kind of tax reforms are being considered 
in the policy debate. It discusses in depth the 
drivers behind the key developments and balances 
the pros and cons of particular tax policy 
alternatives. 
Second, the report aims at enhancing the 
communication and exchange best practice among 
Member States on tax reforms and encourages an 
intensified debate on the role of improved revenue 
systems for growth, employment, and equity. The 
identification of the challenges faced and the 
stocktaking of the main tax policy changes in the 
EU enables an improved exchange of information 
between Member States, as well as an exchange of 
views regarding the challenges and the pros and 
cons of different policy responses. This will 
facilitate the diffusion of better tax policies across 
the EU as Member States may learn from each 
others' policy experience. Better communication 
can reveal the existence of common challenges and 
may suggest ways in which Member States may 
coordinate their actions to achieve better outcomes 
for all. An intensified discussion of tax reforms 
will also raise the awareness of potential spill-over 
effects of particular tax policies, and Member 
States may draw lessons from the discussion on 
how to avoid potential negative effects on other 
Member States. 
The Report may additionally play a role to support 
the reduction of differences among revenue 
systems in the EU where this is appropriate. 
Making tax and social security regulations 
increasingly compatible across Member States 
reduces compliance costs for firms and citizens 
and thereby encourages cross border activities by 
firms and worker mobility within the EU. 
European Commission 
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Increased coordination of revenue system design 
and convergence towards more compatible tax 
policies reduce tax-induced distortions of the 
internal market and thus contribute to increased 
efficiency of European factor and product markets. 
This underlines the common European interest to 
advance the important process of mutually 
beneficial co-operation among Member States 
regarding reforms of their revenue systems. 
The Report is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides a discussion of the importance of revenue 
systems from an economic and fiscal policy 
perspective. Section 3 describes the level and 
structure of taxation in the EU. Section 4 discusses 
the common trends in the development of 
European revenue system, lists the major recent 
tax reforms carried out by Member States and 
considers the role of revenue side policies to 
address the challenges posed by the financial and 
economic crisis. Finally, Section 5 considers 
several selected tax policy topics in more detail 
with an appraisal of various policies and remaining 
challenges. 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF REVENUE SYSTEMS 
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The level of government revenues is largely 
determined by government expenditures. However, 
revenue systems are much more than the pure 
budgetary counterpart of government spending 
since they have important implications in terms of 
the allocation of economic resources. They impact 
on key economic decisions, such as physical and 
human capital investments, labour supply (whether 
individual or collective) and labour demand, the 
decisions to engage in entrepreneurial activity and 
to start up a business, innovation decisions, and 
many others. Taxes also redistribute economic 
resources between economic agents. These effects 
at the micro level translate into the aggregate, so 
that the design of revenue systems substantially 
impacts on the macroeconomic outcomes in terms 
of employment, growth and equity. Therefore, the 
proper design of revenue systems represents a key 
determinant of a strong employment and growth 
performance while insuring fairness and social 
equity. 
From a policy perspective, improving the structure 
of revenue systems has a key role to play for the 
successful implementation of the Lisbon Strategy 
for Jobs and Growth, in particular in the context of 
activating employment policies and in the 
promotion of investment and innovation. This high 
policy relevance is reflected by the fact that the 
recent Annual Progress Report on the Integrated 
Guidelines endorsed by the Spring 2008 European 
Council makes specific recommendations 
addressed to Member States forming part of the 
euro area to "improve the quality of public 
finances by reviewing public expenditures and 
taxation, with the intention to enhance productivity 
and innovation, thereby contributing to economic 
growth and fiscal sustainability". 
The EMU@10 Communication and report by the 
Commission (cf. European Commission (2008b)) 
also stress deeper fiscal policy coordination and 
the better integration of structural reform in overall 
policy-coordination within EMU, including the 
reform of revenue systems. This is due to the 
importance of revenue systems for structural 
improvements of the euro area economy's 
performance but also to the role tax policies can 
play to address the impact of idiosyncratic shocks 
faced by individual countries within the monetary 
union, as well as the likelihood of tax reforms to 
generate spill-over effects to other euro area 
countries. 
The importance of sound revenue systems is also 
reflected in the increased efforts to include tax 
reforms more closely in the monitoring of the 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy for Jobs 
and Growth. The Commission is stepping up these 
efforts. In particular, it considers establishing a 
new database (TAXREF) on tax reforms in the 
Member States. (3)  This database would 
complement the databases on labour market 
(LABREF) and product market reforms (MICREF) 
that contain comprehensive overview of Member 
States' reform efforts in key areas of the Lisbon 
Strategy. The TAXREF database would similarly 
allow Member States and the Commission to track 
better revenue systems changes to assess the 
progress in making European revenue systems 
more supportive of employment and growth. 
Given the high policy relevance of revenues 
systems, policy makers need sound advice 
regarding the direction of reform. To define this 
direction, it is important to consider the various 
shortcomings of current systems and assess the 
available alternatives using an appropriate set of 
criteria for sound revenue systems. While there is 
no consensus in the literature, some observers have 
singled out the high levels of taxation as a key 
reason for low employment levels and 
unsatisfactory economic performance in the EU. 
High and progressive taxes can discourage labour 
supply and demand, and reduce investment 
incentives. Accordingly, these analysts recommend 
a substantial reduction in tax levels to revitalise 
European economies. However, some EU Member 
States have been able to combine elevated levels of 
taxation with a strong economic performance and 
low unemployment. This indicates that the 
determination of the optimal aggregate level of 
taxation is not straightforward and may be of 
secondary importance. Rather, this highlights the 
relevance of the optimal structure and design of the 
(3) The TAXREF database would be managed by European 
Commission (DG TAXUD) and would build on existing 
databases and the information provided by Member States 
in the context of the Working Group "Structures of the 
Taxation Systems". No additional reporting outside the 
reporting mechanism of the Working Group "Structures of 
the Taxation Systems" will be introduced. 
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tax system for a given level of revenues, along 
with the structure and cost-efficiency of public 
spending. As consequence, much could potentially 
be gained from tax reforms that improve the 
structure of the tax system. Such reforms need to 
address issues related to the optimal tax 
composition, but also the details of the tax 
schedule (in particular regarding tax progressivity) 
and the interaction of taxes with the benefit 
system. Moreover, since the expenditure side is 
unaffected by revenue-neutral tax reforms, such 
reforms may be easier to implement politically, 
compared to measures that aim to reduce the 
overall level of expenditures and taxation. The 
analytical framework required to assess the 
improvements toward an optimal tax structure 
ultimately also requires taking into account the 
policy trade-offs between efficiency, and long-
term growth, respectively, and the equity 
objectives. This normative judgement is political 
in nature and is up to the national democratic 
process to resolve. 
An optimal revenue system should fulfil several 
conditions. First, it should be efficient. An efficient 
tax-benefit system insures growth, moves the 
economy towards a desired distribution of income, 
and raises the necessary public funds for spending 
on publicly provided goods with minimal 
distortions. (4)  This includes the avoidance of 
excessive negative incentive effects for 
employment, investment, and innovation, as well 
as proper internalisation of social costs and 
benefits of research and development, human 
capital formation, polluting activities, and other 
activities that generate positive or negative 
externalities. It also encompasses dynamic 
efficiency, i.e., the system should not negatively 
impinge on investment, innovation and growth. 
Second, an optimal tax system should be fair as it 
aims at moving the economy towards a desired 
distribution of income or other desired equity 
goals. Third, an optimal tax system should be 
simple and transparent. Fourth, it should minimise 
incentives and opportunities for tax avoidance, 
(4) This is in fact the key question in the literature on optimal 
taxation: How can the government maximise the welfare of 
its citizens subject to the requirement of raising a given 
amount of tax revenue to provide public goods and services 
or to redistribute income subject to technical and 
informational constraints? 
evasion and fraud. Finally, it should have low 
administrative demands and low compliance costs. 
These important dimensions of revenue systems 
have also been stressed by the (ECOFIN) Council 
conclusions in the June 2007 stating that "The 
Council therefore stresses the need for revenue 
systems that can enhance growth and employment 
and deliver as stable as possible revenues. It 
encourages Member States in their national 
responsibilities to move further towards robust, 
fair, efficient and growth-enhancing revenue 
systems." Such criteria for sound revenues systems 
make it possible to consider the current state of 
revenue systems in the EU and to assess whether 
ongoing tax reforms are moving European tax 
systems closer towards such optimal revenue 
systems and what kind of reforms may be 
appropriate to better achieve these objectives. 
3. THE LEVEL AND STRUCTURE OF TAXATION IN THE EU 
Graph 3.1: Evolution of total taxes (incl. SSCs) in Europe, 1970-2006
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Based on the most recent available yearly 
indicators (2006 or 2007), this section provides an 
overview of the structure of revenue systems in the
EU and their evolution. (5)  For a more 
comprehensive and detailed description the reader
is referred to the Commission's annual report on
the “Taxation trends in the European Union (see 
European Commission 2008a). The present
overview sets the scene for a more detailed
discussion of some key developments in sections 4
and 5. 
3.1. TOTAL TAXES 
Tax burdens – measured by total taxes (including
social security contributions) as a percentage of
GDP (6) – are high in the European Union, in
(5) This section partly draws on Carone et al. (2007) and 
European Commission (2008c), but updates and
complements the data and analysis where appropriate. 
(6) Despite its simplicity – or rather because of it – the total 
tax-to-GDP ratio remains a rough indicator that carries
interesting summary information but also suffers from
deficiencies. The indicator cannot be seen in isolation of
the level of public expenditures and of the use of other
alternative means of government intervention such as
regulation. Moreover, total tax revenues convey little 
information on the impact – in terms of distortions and in 
terms of redistribution – of tax systems.
comparison to other developed countries. (7)  
These high tax levels were gradually built up since 
1970, cf. Graph 3.1. The growth of the total tax
burden was strong in the 1970s, but slowed down
in the 1980s, before growing again more strongly
in the 1990s. The total tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU 
peaked at the turn of the century before starting to
decrease. The latest data, however, show a
renewed pick-up of the overall tax burden. (8)  
Taxation levels mainly follow the financing needs 
stemming from government expenditure decisions.
The many years of increasing tax burdens in most
Member States mainly reflect increases in public 
expenditures. The 1970s were a period of rapid 
growth of public expenditures, and this shows up
in the strong increases in tax levels. The 1980s saw 
lower expenditure grows, with expenditures 
picking up again in the early 1990s. More recently,
overall levels of expenditure have started to be
reduced in an effort to consolidate public finances. 
For the years to come one can expect that due to
(7) According to OECD data (based on a slightly different
methodology than the Commission data used in the present 
analysis), the group of 19 EU OECD members had a total 
tax-to-GDP ratio of 38.7% compared to the OECD average 
(including the EU countries of 35.9% in 2006.
(8) Short-term changes in the ratio of taxes to GDP need to be
interpreted with care, as direct taxes, in particular, are pro-
cyclical. 
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various factors, such as ageing populations, high 
demand elasticity of public services, relatively low 
productivity growth in the public sector (9), 
changing life and work patterns, etc., spending 
pressures and, as a consequence, tax burdens are 
likely to remain high. This outlook indicates that, 
on the on hand, Member States need to increase 
the efficiency of their spending. On the other hand, 
Member States increasingly need to look to the 
revenue side for efficiency-enhancing reforms that 
can boost employment and growth, and promote 
the desired fairness and equity. 
(9) Given that the public sector provides goods and services 
(education, health care, long-term care, etc.) that are more 
labour intensive than goods and services provided by the 
private sector, productivity tends to grow slower in the 
public sector. This observation is referred to as "Baumol's 
Law". 
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While the EU as a whole may be considered a high 
tax economy there is wide variation in the tax
levels across Member States, cf. Graph 3.2 and
Graph 3.3 . The cross country differences are not
only interesting from a static perspective but also 
provide case studies on the dynamic experiences 
that may have differed substantially from the
average development in the EU. Several cases
stand out. First, some countries have been
particularly successful to stabilise their total tax-to-
GDP ratio either from the 1970s – this is the case 
of Ireland – at a level around 35%, or from the
1980s – such as Germany (at about 40%),
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (all at
about 45%). (10)  Second, the level of taxes in the 
economy dramatically increased – by some 10 
percentage points (pp) – in Finland, Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain in the 1980s and 1990s,
although starting from comparatively low levels. 
The same 'catch-up' effect occurred in Cyprus and 
Malta over the last decade. Third, some of the 
recently acceded Member States experienced in the
period 1995-2006 important decreases in their total 
tax burdens. This is the case of the Slovak 
Republic (10.9 pp), Estonia (6.7 pp), Hungary (4.4
pp), Poland (3.3 pp) and Latvia (3 pp). Finally, 
about half of the Member States experienced a 
decrease in their tax-to-GDP ratio between 2000 
and 2006. This decrease was especially marked in
Germany, Greece, Finland, Slovakia, and Sweden. 
The GDP-weighted average for the EU-27 was at 
39.5% in 2007, ranging from 28.6% in Romania 
(in 2006) and 29.6% in Slovakia (in 2007) to 
48.7% in Denmark (in 2007).
Graph 3.2: Total taxes (incl. SSCs), % GDP, 2007
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Note: RO refers to 2006.
(10) Data for the 1970-1995 period are based on ESA79 data. 
Those for the 1995-2006 period are based on ESA95.
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Graph 3.3: Change in total taxes (% GDP) in percentage points, 2006-2007
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Given these important differences across countries, 
it is interesting to consider how the dispersion of
the tax burden in EU Member States has been
evolving over recent years. Graph 3.4 displays the
evolution of the coefficient of variation (11) of total
taxes in the EU 27 countries since 1995. (12) The 
dispersion of tax burdens is diminishing, and this
trend appears to be more pronounced over recent 
years. This indicates some convergence across
Member States, although differences remain 
substantial. 
3.2. TAX COMPOSITION: DIRECT TAXES,
INDIRECT TAXES AND SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Aggregate tax revenues are the most general way 
to describe revenue systems. Moreover, as 
discussed, they are closely related to government 
expenditures, and in particular to the extent of
(11) The coefficient of variation is a normalised dispersion 
measure. It is computed as the standard deviation divided
by the mean. Calculation was carried out using arithmetic 
mean of EU 27.
(12) Please note that data for Bulgaria and Romania are
available only from 2000 onwards for the former and 2001 
for the latter. 
redistribution and social spending. The preferences
for such spending, and similarly for other publicly 
provided goods and services may differ 
substantially across Member States. Revenue 
systems can be described in more detail. The first
step in this direction is to consider tax
composition. The composition can be considered
in terms of the type of tax levied, such as direct
taxes, indirect taxes and social security 
contributions (SSCs). The composition can also be 
looked at according to a classification of the taxes 
according to economic function, such as taxes on 
capital, taxes on labour and consumption taxes, as
well as environmental taxes. (13) 
(13) There are, of course, potentially other ways to decompose 
tax revenues. The current decomposition follows the one 
applied in European Commission (2008a). All data on tax 
revenues are from European Commission (2008a). The 
'Annex C: Methodology and explanatory notes' of that 
publication gives extensive details on the underlying
methodology. The data may also be found in electronic 
format from the Eurostat web page and via the following 
link to the DG Taxation and Customs Union homepage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxtrends.
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Graph 3.4: Dispersion (coefficient of variation) of total taxes % GDP, EU-27
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Graph 3.5: Direct taxes, indirect taxes and SSCs, EU-27
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Graph 3.6: Tax revenues from direct taxes, 2006
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Graph 3.7: Tax revenues from indirect taxes, 2006
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The analysis of the composition of tax revenue or
‘tax mix’ shows that the vast bulk of tax revenue 
raised in the EU, indeed more than 90 per cent, 
comes from three main sources: income taxes, 
taxes on goods and services, and social security
contributions (SSCs). Graph 3.5 displays the 
evolution of tax revenues from direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and SSCs from 1995-2006 in the
EU. When considering the evolution of tax
revenues from these three broad categories, it is
important to recall that tax revenues from different
sources are differently affected by the business 
Graph 3.8: Tax revenues from SSCs, 2006
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Graph 3.9: Tax dispersion (coefficient of variation) of direct taxes, indirect taxes and SSCs,
EU-27
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Graph 3.10: Tax revenues by economic functions, EU-27
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There is substantial variance across Member States 
in the importance of direct taxes, indirect taxes and
SSCs as is shown by Graph 3.6, Graph 3.7 and 
Graph 3.8. Direct taxes take on less than 20% of
total taxes collected in Bulgaria but reach over 
61% in Denmark. The share of indirect taxes in
total taxation varies from about 30% in Belgium, 
in the Czech Republic and in Germany to over 
55% in Bulgaria. Finally, SSCs represent only 
about 2.1% of the total taxation in Denmark, and 
also play only a rather small role in Ireland, the
UK, and Malta, but make for over 40% of the total 
taxes in Germany, in Slovakia and in the Czech 
Republic. More recent 2007 data using the OECD 
classification are provided in Table A1.2 in the
statistical appendix (Section Statistical annex). 
These data also indicate that the tax composition as 
displayed in Graph 3.5 has remained relatively 
stable from 2006 to 2007. 
cycle. This complicates the interpretation of 
changes in the importance of these tax components
because structural and cyclical components should
be taken into account. Direct taxes are moving 
most pro-cyclically because of the sensitivity of
corporate taxes to the business cycle and because 
of the progressive nature of personal income tax 
(PIT) schemes. SSCs, which are closely related to 
the aggregate wage bill, tend to move somewhat 
counter-cyclically, mainly due to the counter-
cyclical movement of the labour share. Finally, 
indirect taxes should be theoretically relatively
stable, but appear to move slightly pro-cyclical in
practice. 
With the caveat regarding the disentanglement of
cyclical and structural components of the actual
movements in mind, it appears fair to say that 
indirect taxes have slowly been gaining importance 
over recent years. At the same time, SSCs have
lost some importance, potentially reflecting the 
fact that governments have been trying to reduce
the tax burden on labour. As regards direct taxes, 
there appears to be an upward movement as well, 
but this is more difficult to assess given the 
presence of pronounced cyclical effects. The
statistical annex provides a more detailed overview 
of the developments of direct and indirect taxes 
and SSCs since 1995, including a finer
disaggregation of these tax categories. 
The dispersion among Member States of tax 
revenues from direct and indirect taxes in the EU
has remained somewhat stable over recent years, 
cf. Graph 3.9. The dispersion of direct taxes
appears to be somewhat pro-cyclical. The
dispersion of SSCs appears to display a slight
downward trend, although this decline has been
levelling off in recent years. This reduced 
dispersion of SSCs revenues potentially reflects a 
certain convergence in the financing of social
26 
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protection across the EU. Some Member States
that traditionally have been relying mostly on
SSCs to finance social spending have introduced
several elements of tax financing and reduced 
SSCs. Indirect taxes are the least dispersed in
Europe due to the high level of harmonisation. 
While the late 1990s saw some further 
convergence, since 2000, revenues from indirect
taxes have been slowly diverging again. 
3.3. TAX COMPOSITION BY ECONOMIC
FUNCTION 
Tax revenues from consumption have remained 
fairly stable across EU Member States in the 1995-
2006 period. In response to the need to put in place
more employment-friendly tax systems one 
noticeable trend has been the decrease in labour 
taxation in a number of countries over the last
decade. This is reflected in the slight downward 
trend of taxes on labour. However, measures have
tended to be either narrowly targeted or of limited
scope so that only a small reduction is visible at 
the aggregate level. Section 5.1 of this report looks
in more detail at how tax reforms have reduced
disincentives to work. Tax revenue from taxes on
capital is substantially cyclical but shows a slightly
upward trend since 1995. This is considered in
more detail in section 5.3.
Graph 3.11: Tax revenues from taxes on labour, 2006
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The tax structure can also be decomposed in
relation to the economic function, such as 
consumption, or factors of production, i.e. capital
and labour. The imputation of certain tax revenues 
to economic functions is based on the imputation 
of certain revenues to the tax bases they are 
originating from. From an economic perspective it 
must be underlined that the actual incidence of a
given tax may be very different from the base a tax
is legally attached to. Graph 3.10 provides an 
overview of the development of tax revenues from
taxes on labour, capital and consumption over 
recent years. 
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Graph 3.12: Tax revenues from taxes on capital, 2006
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Graph 3.13: Tax revenues from taxes on consumption, 2006
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
BG EE CY RO LV MT SK PT HU LT PL GR IE SI DK NL FI UK CZ AT EU
27
LU EA
15
ES DE SE BE FR IT
% total taxes % GDPSource: Commission services
There is large variation across Member States with 
regard to the relative importance of taxes on
labour, capital and on consumption, cf. Graph 
3.11, Graph 3.12, and Graph 3.13. Taxes on labour 
vary from slightly above 10% of GDP in Romania, 
Bulgaria, Ireland and Malta to over 29% in 
Sweden in 2006. Overall EU Member States still
largely rely on taxes on labour but they differ as to
whether those taxes are payable by employees or
employers. On average, in 2006 about 43% of
taxes on employed workers are paid by employers
but the share varies from 2.5% in Denmark to
around 60% in a range of countries. Tax revenues
from taxes on capital also vary largely among
28 
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Member States, ranging from below 3% of GDP in
Lithuania to over 11% in the UK and Italy in
2006. (14)  
Taxes on consumption carry a relatively similar
weight across Member States, while there is much 
more variation across Member States in the 
taxation of labour and capital. This is due to the 
higher degree of tax harmonisation in important
consumption taxes such as the VAT and motor fuel
excises in Europe, and this is reflected in the lower 
dispersion of consumption taxes relative to taxes 
on labour and capital, cf. Graph 3.14. The
dispersion of taxes on labour appears to have
remained rather constant over recent years. The tax 
revenues from capital, however, show a tendency
towards a reduced dispersion reflecting some
convergence mainly in corporate tax revenues, cf. 
also section 5.3 and Graph 3.17, where a rather
strong convergence of tax revenues can be 
observed over recent years. As regards 
consumption taxes, further convergence appears to
(14) European Commission (2008a) also includes so-called 
implicit tax rates which measure the effective average tax 
burden on different types of economic income or activity, 
i.e. on labour, consumption and capital, as the ratio 
between the revenue from the tax type under consideration 
and its (maximum) possible base. These ratios are also a 
good measure to compare the tax burden in Member States 
and to analyse the development over time. 
have occurred in the late 1990s, partly due to the 
enlargement of the European Union and the 
preparation of the new Member States for 
accession. However, since 2003 the dispersion of 
consumption tax revenues has been increasing
again. This could reflect the divergence process
that can be observed in the field of environmental,
and in particular energy taxation at about the same
time, cf. section 3.4 and Graph 3.17. 
3.4. ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
Environmental taxation is frequently regarded as 
an important pillar of government finances and 
often meant to play an increasing role for financing 
government in the future. Advocates of a stronger 
reliance on this sort of taxation point to the 
potential of welfare enhancing nature of such 
taxes. In particular, such taxation could serve as a
welcome instrument to internalise social costs of 
polluting activities. At the same time the tax 
revenues could be used to reduce the tax burden on
labour with the associated beneficial effects on 
employment. This potential double beneficial
effect of environmental taxes is usually referred to
as the "double dividend" hypothesis. 
Graph 3.14: Dispersion (coefficient of variation) of tax revenues, % GDP, by economic 
function, EU-27
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In practice, however, the importance of
environmental taxation has been decreasing in the 
EU on average. This trend is largely driven by the 
declining role of energy taxes which represent the 
most important environmental taxes (cf. Graph
3.15), accounting for some three quarters of
environmental taxes at the European Union
average. (15)  This downward trend may be due to
a number of reasons. First, for a given level of
taxes, an income elasticity of energy demand 
below unity will result in lower tax revenues (as a 
percentage of GDP) from energy taxes as the 
economy grows. Second, energy taxes are usually
applied on a pro rata basis, i.e., per litre, or per 
cubic metre, etc. As energy consumption reacts 
negatively to increases in energy prices, revenues
from energy taxes are being reduced, without any
changes in tax policies. Thus, reduced revenues
from energy taxes may partly reflect the surge in 
energy prices over recent years. Accordingly, if the
current reduction in energy prices continues, tax 
revenues from energy taxes are likely to recover. 
Moreover, pro rata taxes are automatically reduced 
(15) The other two categories of environmental taxation are
taxes on transport and taxes on pollution and resources.
Tax revenues from these two categories have remained 
stable in the EU-27 at 0.6% of GDP and 0.1% of GDP, 
respectively, over the period from 1995 to 2006. For
further details and information on the taxes comprised by
these categories, see European Commission (2008a).
by inflation in real terms, so frequent adjustments 
are necessary to maintain the same level of 
revenues in real terms. Adjustments that fall short 
of inflation accordingly result in reduced revenues.
Finally, policy instruments other than taxes, such 
as emission trading, have gained importance in
recent years. 
While the data show that environmental taxes have
seen their importance reduced on average in 
Europe over recent years, there are substantial 
differences across Member States. This variance
may be explained by differences in income levels,
as the demand for environmental quality is
typically highly income-elastic. Member States 
also differ in their need to levy environmental 
taxes as congestion charges, which is a more 
important policy objective in more densely 
populated Member States. This can also be seen
from Graph 3.16 which shows the importance of
environmental taxes in all Member States in 2006. 
Graph 3.15: Environmental and energy tax revenues, % GDP, EU-27
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Accordingly, tax revenues from environmental 
taxation show large dispersion across Member 
States cf. Graph 3.17. However, there has been 
substantial convergence until 2003 in the 
importance revenues from environmental taxes as 
a percentage of GDP. This convergence may 
reflect the relative harmonisation introduced by the 
European minima but also the limits to national tax
policies in this field due competitive pressures. 
These pressures arise either directly in the form of
cross border shopping of motor fuels or indirectly
as high after tax energy prices can result in the 
relocation of energy intensive sectors to Member 
States providing lower after tax energy prices. In 
Graph 3.16: Tax revenues from environmental taxation, 2006
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Graph 3.17: Dispersion (coefficient of variation) of corporate and environmental tax
revenues, % GDP, EU-27
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recent years, however, this process has been 
reversed. This may reflect a divergence in the 
importance attached to these taxes by Member 
States. Another explanation may be that the 
European minima in energy taxation have become 
less binding and thus their potential to compress 
the variance in tax revenues from energy taxes. 
The importance of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions has added another key objective to 
environmental taxes. This has led some Member 
States to include such objectives into their tax 
systems. For example, several Member States have 
already made vehicle taxes dependent on average 
CO2 emissions. In the years to come it will be 
interesting to observe how the different designs 
that are being introduced by Member States 
perform to address the imminent climate change 
challenges. 
Energy and environmental taxes have a European 
dimension. This regards their impact on short-run 
macro-developments, as well as their importance 
for European competitiveness, employment, 
growth and equity. Many key environmental 
challenges, such as climate change, the protection 
of the seas, biodiversity, etc. are international by 
nature, so coordinated action at the European and 
international level are pivotal for proper policy 
responses to these issues. Finally, differential 
energy and environmental taxes can severely 
distort the functioning of the internal market and 
need therefore particular attention from the 
European perspective which is well reflected by 
the relatively pronounced policy competence at the 
European level on these tax issues, in particular in 
comparison with other aspects of tax policy. The 
review of the Energy Tax Directive (ETD) 
provides a welcome opportunity to update the 
framework for improved environmental taxation 
by the Member States. 
4. MAIN TRENDS AND RECENT REFORMS OF REVENUE 
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Over recent years, Member States have carried out 
many reforms of their tax systems. These reforms 
have been driven by several interrelated factors. 
First, high unemployment rates and low 
participation rates in many Member States have 
posed the question of how to improve the 
conditions for more employment. The growing 
awareness that an excessive tax burden on labour 
and its interaction with the benefit systems lowers 
labour demand and labour supply incentives, 
especially for those with low earnings potential, 
has led Member States to consider the move 
towards more employment-friendly labour 
taxation. In doing this, they have also faced the 
difficulty of finding alternative tax bases to finance 
their expenditures. 
Second, some Member States have also tried to 
rationalise and simplify their tax systems. Tax cut 
cum base broadening reforms are one important 
element of such a strategy. Such base-broadening 
often implies economic benefits but, particularly in 
the field of corporate taxation, the base-broadening 
measures need to be carefully assessed. 
Third, increased economic integration, ageing 
societies and technological progress rapidly 
change the environment in which revenue systems 
are operating. The design of revenue systems is an 
important determinant of how Member States can 
cope with the challenges that arise from these 
relevant changes. 
Fourth, the desired level and type of fairness and 
equity continues to be a key issue of the political 
debate in the Member States, and the role of 
revenue systems (along with other government 
policies) plays a fundamental role for how these 
objectives can be achieved. These debates directly 
relate to the previous three factors, while the 
judgement on how to optimally address the 
corresponding policy trade-offs remains a political 
decision. 
4.1. COMMON TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN 
REVENUE SYSTEMS 
Section 3 has provided evidence that substantial 
differences in the level and the structure of 
taxation exist among Member States. This raises 
the questions of whether European revenue 
systems are evolving in similar ways, and to what 
extent there are common trends in the European 
revenue systems. Section 3 has already provided 
some rough quantitative evidence on this. There 
appears to be some indications of similar 
developments among the revenue systems of 
Member States, at least along several dimensions: 
• There appears to be some convergence in the 
size of government expenditures and thus, in 
the need for government financing. This 
tendency is reflected in the reduction of the 
dispersion of the tax burden documented in 
Graph 3.4 and appears to be more pronounced 
since 2001. 
• Social protection represents the biggest part of 
government expenditures. Thus, the financing 
of the social protection systems is a key 
determinant of the structure of revenue 
systems. In this area we can observe that 
countries that have traditionally relied 
predominantly on tax financing for their social 
protection systems are considering stronger 
links between payments and benefit 
entitlements. On the other hand, we see that 
many countries that have traditionally almost 
exclusively relied on SSCs to finance their 
social protection systems are increasingly 
complementing or substituting this traditional 
financing with some additional tax-financed 
funds from the general budget. This is reflected 
in the reduction of the dispersion of revenues 
from SSCs (cf. Graph 3.9). 
• Member States are increasingly moving away 
from comprehensive income taxation. The 
classic Schanz-Haig-Simons approach to 
income taxation treats all income streams such 
as labour income, capital income, income from 
entrepreneurial activity, etc. equally. The 
different income components are added up and 
subjected to the income tax schedule. However, 
the differential mobility of the underlying tax 
bases has led several Member States to tax 
incomes form different sources differently. 
This is explicitly the case in the Nordic "dual" 
income tax systems, which are increasingly 
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viewed by other Member Sates as a potential 
role model for their tax systems. 
• Mobile tax bases see their tax burden reduced. 
The move away from comprehensive income 
taxation to dual income taxes is one sign of this 
development. The specific reduction in the tax 
burden carried by more mobile tax bases can 
also be inferred from the differential treatment 
of incorporated and non-incorporated 
businesses. Non-incorporated firms, which are 
typically smaller and less mobile 
internationally do not profit from reductions in 
corporate tax rates but are often subject to the 
same base broadening measures that determine 
taxable profits. Thus, the more mobile 
corporate firms are favoured over the less 
mobile non-incorporated firms. 
• The recent enlargements of the EU have 
resulted in a greater variety of tax systems. 
This also holds for corporate taxation. Over the 
past years, however, there are several signs that 
indicate some convergence among Member 
States in the taxation of corporations. (16)  This 
seems to be driven by at least two factors. First, 
the decisions of the ECJ regarding the (non-
)discrimination between domestic and cross-
border activities has reduced the freedom of 
individual Member States in the design and 
application of their corporate tax codes. 
Second, the two-dimensional (tax) competition 
for physical capital and book profits has led 
Member States to cut statutory taxes to increase 
their attractiveness as a location for book 
profits, and to use adjustments of the tax base, 
in particular appropriate depreciation rules, to 
target the marginal effective tax rate on 
physical capital investment or to limit revenue 
losses, cf. Devereux et al. (2008). 
• Classic wealth taxes are less used in Europe. 
Sweden and Spain have abolished their wealth 
taxes in 2007 and 2008, respectively, joining 
other Member States, such as Austria and 
Denmark, while some keep wealth taxes. 
(16) Considering the development of all EU 27 Member States, 
such signs of convergence are the tendency towards lower 
statutory corporate tax rates, cf. Graph 5.13, and the lower 
dispersion of the importance of corporate tax revenues, cf. 
Graph 3.17. 
• A frequent advice to policy makers in the EU 
and elsewhere has been to choose large tax 
bases with small tax rates. This 
recommendation has strong conceptual 
foundations in economic theory given that the 
excess burden of taxation grows more strongly 
in the rate than in the base. This policy advice 
has been put into practice over recent years in 
several tax policy fields, however with 
important differences across Member States, 
tax fields and timing. In the field of corporate 
taxation where declining statutory tax rates 
have been accompanied by an expansion of the 
tax base. While many Member States had 
engaged in such reforms already in the 1990s, 
the German 2008 corporate tax reform is a 
more recent example. Luxembourg has 
introduced a base broadening corporate tax 
reform effective as of 2009. Base broadening 
efforts can also be observed in the field of 
personal income taxation in some Member 
States were tax deductions have been reduced 
or have been completely discarded. In the field 
of indirect taxation the pattern is less clear, 
since some Member State governments appear 
more willing to employ their possibilities to 
resort to deviations from the standard VAT rate 
with the consequence of narrowing the tax base 
to which the standard rate applies. 
The common trends in the European revenue 
systems and the degree to which they are actually 
converging need further in-depth evaluation. 
Nevertheless, one can already consider the various 
facets of this process. Convergence will make 
Member States' revenue systems more compatible 
with each other. This will reduce administrative 
and compliance costs, and will improve the 
functioning of the internal market. The process 
may also indicate the diffusion of successful 
policies, while it could possibly also reflect the 
effect of fiscal competition. Some Member States 
may see themselves forced into the adoption of tax 
policies that are either in conflict with their 
national preferences regarding the specific 
allocation of the tax burden and the associated 
equity-efficiency trade-off, or that are suboptimal 
from an efficiency perspective. These 
considerations suggest that there may be benefits 
in more actively co-ordinating tax policies. 
Another important point may be the nature of the 
convergence process. One possibility is that policy 
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makers are adjusting their revenue systems in 
response to external competitive pressures, or 
because of imitation of successful policies 
observed elsewhere. However, it may also be that 
Member States themselves (and their economies 
and the preferences of their populations) are 
converging. In this case, tax policies, and the 
outcome of such policies should also be 
converging. In the latter case, however, tax 
policies only play an adjusting role. 
4.2. TAX REFORMS IN MEMBER STATES 
This section provides an overview of some major 
tax reforms in Member States in Box 4.1 below. 
While it does not provide a comprehensive 
summary of all policy changes that affect the 
revenue systems of Member States, it focuses on 
the developments in a few Member States where 
substantial tax reforms have been enacted. Of 
course, since nearly all Member States update their 
tax systems and their tax administrations by minor 
changes and amendments to existing tax legislation 
and administrative procedures, the definition of a 
tax reform requires some degree of discretionary 
judgement to decide whether modifications are 
sufficiently substantial to be singled out and to be 
called reforms. (17) 
(17) At present, this is based on a necessarily subjective 
assessment. The current report uses information on tax 
reforms from various internal and external sources. Future 
issues would additionally draw on the forthcoming 
TAXREF database, managed by the European Commission 
(DG Taxud) in cooperation with Member States (the 
Working Group "Structures of the Taxation Systems"), 
when available. 
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Box 4.1: Recent tax reforms in Member States
Bulgaria
Bulgaria introduced a flat tax scheme for its PIT in 2008 with a tax rate of 10%, replacing a progressive
scheme with three tax brackets (10-24%). Contrary to other flat tax schemes in the EU there is no basic tax 
free allowance in the introduced scheme. The corporate tax rate remained unchanged at 10%. The move to
the flat tax regime was motivated by economic and governance motivations. On the one hand, policy makers
wanted to increase investment incentives to speed up Bulgaria's catching up process with the EU. On the 
other hand, the flat tax is regarded as an important instrument to increase transparency of the tax system and 
to reduce the administrative burden and the potential scope for corruption which has frequently be seen as an
important impediment to an accelerated development of the country. The share of social security
contributions was modified in favour of the employer (from 65% to 60% for the employer and up from 35%
to 40% for the employee) 
Czech Republic
The 2008 tax reform that was enacted in the Czech Republic is potentially the most substantial tax reforms
in the EU in 2008. While its most outstanding feature is the move to flat tax regime, the reform package also
comprised a range of additional changes. The PIT was changed from a four-tier progressive tax (top bracket
at 32%) to a flat tax rate of 15%. At the same time, the tax base was increased to include SSCs. The reform
also comprises changes in corporate and indirect taxation. The corporate tax rate will be gradually reduced 
from 24% before the reform to a target value of 19% by 2010. The reduced VAT rate is increased from 5%
to 9%. Finally, ceilings were introduced on pensions and health insurance contributions. Social security
contributions are set to be reduced in 2009, by 1 percentage point for the employer and by 1.5 percentage
point for the employee.
Germany
Germany carried out a substantial corporate tax reform in 2008. (1)  The first important element of the
reform was a sharp reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate from 25% to 15%. Together with the local
trade tax (varying by location) and the solidarity surcharge which are also levied on corporate income, the
overall tax rate after the reform is about 30%.  
In 2007, the PIT for high income earners was adjusted. Above a gross yearly income of € 250000 an
additional tax bracket of with a marginal tax of 45%, the so-called "tax on the rich" was introduced, 
replacing the former top rate of 42%. On the other hand, the 2008 CIT reform introduced a number of base
broadening measures. These not only affected incorporated, but also non-incorporated businesses. The
reform can thus be seen as a classic rate-cut cum base-broadening reform. Important elements of the base
broadening aspects of the reform were the repeal of declining-balance depreciation, stricter transfer pricing
rules, stricter loss deduction rules (in particular in case of acquired firms), and restrictions on the
deductibility of interest. 
Two further aspects of the reform are the new preferential treatment of retained earnings in sole
proprietorships and partnerships (non-incorporated businesses) and the introduction of a final withholding
tax of 25% that will as of 2009 apply to interest payments, dividends and most forms of capital gains. 
Greece
Greece enacted a substantial tax reform of the PIT in 2008. The reform stipulates a reduction of marginal tax
rates from 29% to 27% and from 39% to 37% in the respective tax brackets.
(1) A good description and a proper assessment of the German reform can be found in Homburg (2007). 
(Continued on the next page)
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Spain 
The last phase of the Spanish corporate tax reform of 2006, starting effectively as of 2007 entered the 
second stage in 2008. The tax rate was further reduced from 32.5% to 30% for taxable periods commencing 
on 1 January 2008. The reduction for companies under the special hydrocarbons regime was reduced to 35% 
in 2008. For small and medium-sized companies, the reduction was made in a single phase from the 2006 
reduced rate of 30% to 25% from 1 January 2007. 
Spain also abolished the wealth tax and provided a € 400 tax rebate on the personal income tax. 
Furthermore, several further tax measures have been introduced over the year 2008, in particular to provide 
mortgage relief to homeowners (see the summary table in section 9 for details). 
Latvia 
At the end of 2008 a number of corporate income tax incentives were introduced to stimulate investments 
into machinery, to promote research and development and to favour reinvestment of earned profit as well. 
The period of loss carry-forward was changed from 5 to 8 years. 
Along with increase of the VAT standard rate from 18 % to 21 %, the PIT rate was reduced from 25 % to 23 
% and basic personal income tax allowance and tax allowances for children, unemployed spouse and 
disabled persons were raised as of 1 January 2009. At the same time several goods and services were deleted 
from the list of goods and services to what VAT reduced rate is applicable. After shortening of the list, the 
VAT reduced rate is applicable only to few items (electricity and natural gas to households for private 
consumption, central district heating, pharmaceutical products, medical equipment, transport of passengers). 
Besides that, the VAT reduced rate is applicable to periodicals until the end of 2009. 
From 1 January 2009, the excise duty on cigarettes was increased and has reached the EU minimum level. 
From 1 February 2009 excise duty rates on fuel (the EU minimum level on unleaded petrol, gas oil and 
kerosene was reached), alcoholic beverages and other smoking tobacco were increased. 
Lithuania 
In April of 2008 the amendments to Corporate Income Tax Law were adopted, under which special tax 
incentives for research and development (R&D) were introduced, allowing triple deduction of R&D costs.  
At the end of 2008 Lithuania has adopted some important amendments to the tax laws which are applied 
from 1 January 2009. Taking into consideration that direct 6 per cent pre – tax health insurance contributions 
were introduced instead of allocating 30 per cent share of personal income tax to Compulsory Health 
Insurance Fund, the personal income tax rate was reduced to 15 per cent (except dividends which are subject 
to 20 per cent income tax). Moreover, the procedure of application of tax-exempt amount was changed:  tax 
exempt amount is applied only to employment income and is increased for low-income persons and 
gradually reduced taking into account a level of the income of the individual.  
The corporate income tax rate was increased from 15 per cent to 20 per cent. On the other hand, corporate 
income tax incentive for entities which invest into essential technological modernisation was established 
allowing the reduction of taxable profit up to 50 per cent by expenses incurred acquiring the property, 
defined in the Law.  
From 1 January 2009 the standard VAT rate was increased from 18 per cent to 19 per cent. Furthermore, the 
reduced VAT rates were abolished (with the exception of a reduced 5 per cent VAT rate for the supply of 
some pharmaceuticals and medical aids, a  reduced 9 per cent VAT rate for books and not periodical 
informational publication applicable until 30 June 2009). 
(Continued on the next page) 
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4.3. TAX POLICY RESPONSES TO THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Member States' governments and the EU as a
whole are currently facing the challenge of how to 
address the financial crisis and its impact on the 
real economy. Individual Member States have
been, and will be, affected by the crisis in different
ways depending on several factors. First, the size,
the structure and the risk exposure of their 
financial sectors; second, the macroeconomic
stability, in particular the sustainability of public 
finances and the capacity to avoid exchange rate
and balance of payments crisis; third, the speed 
and degree with which the crisis will spread to the
real economy; fourth, the external shocks to 
Member States' aggregate demand which depend
on their main trading partners' economic
performance. As pointed out in the Commission
Communication " From financial crisis to 
recovery: A European framework for action" (18),
government budget positions are likely to
deteriorate considerably in coming years. Tax
revenues from profit and capital income are likely
to be severely reduced, but also revenues from
consumption and labour taxes will be reduced 
somewhat lagged, as employment follows the
cyclical downturn and wage growth and
consumption slow down. Counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies on the revenue side will also have a direct 
impact on total revenues and an indirect one via
their effect on economic activity. 
(18) COM (2008) 706 final,  29 October 2008.
As stressed in the European Economic Recovery
Plan (19), (the Commission's response to the 
current economic situation), given the scale of the
crisis we are facing, the EU needs a co-ordinated 
approach. There is a need to bring together all the
policy levers available at EU and national level,
most of which, and in particular those which can
stimulate consumer demand in the short term, are 
in the hands of the Member States. This of course 
includes measures on the revenue side. Member 
States have very different starting points in terms 
of fiscal room for manoeuvre and that makes 
effective coordination all the more important. 
Tax policies have an important role to play for 
stabilisation and recovery. The degree to which
revenue systems will fulfil their role as automatic
stabilisers depends substantially on their 
characteristics, such as the degree of progressivity 
of the PIT and various provisions for the taxation
of incorporated and non-incorporated firms (loss-
offsets, tax accounting rules, etc.). Beyond the
automatic stabilisers, however, the mainstream
view among economists assigns the stabilisation 
task principally to monetary policy and assigns
active fiscal policy a secondary role. This is
mainly due to the time lags and the complexity of
engineering sound counter-cyclical fiscal policies 
and the advances in the conduct of monetary 
policy. However, problems in the financial sector
suggest that the effectiveness of monetary policy is 
impaired in the current circumstances. 
Discretionary fiscal policy thus needs to assume a
more important stabilisation role than in a situation 
(19) COM (800), 26 November 2008.
Excise duties on fuel and alcoholic beverages were significantly increased as from 1 January 2009.
Moreover, excise duties on tobacco products will be increased from March and September 2009. 
Sweden 
In 2008, the earned income tax credit that was introduced in 2007 was raised by SEK 11 billion. After the
raise, the earned income tax credit in total amounts to SEK 51 billion, or 1.7 percent of GDP. Sweden has
eliminated its state property tax on private homes and apartment buildings, as of January 2008. It has instead
introduced a municipal fee that has a ceiling of SEK 6000 per private home and SEK 1200 per apartment. 
The ceiling is indexed with the average income growth (income index). The change amounts to a substantial
reduction of the property tax for owners of high value properties, but the raise is offset by an increase in the
taxation of capital gains from housing. Sweden has also abolished its wealth tax as of 2007. 
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with a smoothly functioning financial sector. The 
Commission has recently outlined the role and the 
necessary features of a sound fiscal stimulus, 
including measures on the revenue side, in its 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), which 
are reproduced in Box 4.2. 
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Box 4.2: Criteria for a sound fiscal stimulus
The European Commission's (2008e) European Economic Recovery Plan (ERRP) spelled out the following 
criteria for a sound fiscal stimulus: 
(1) It should be timely, temporary, targeted, and co-ordinated 
National budgetary stimulus packages should be: 
– timely so that they quickly support economic activity during the period of low demand, as delays in 
implementation could mean that the fiscal impulse only comes when the recovery is underway; 
– temporary so as to avoid a permanent deterioration in budgetary positions which would undermine 
sustainability and eventually require financing through sustained future tax increases; 
– targeted towards the source of the economic challenge (increasing unemployment, credit constrained 
firms/households, etc. and supporting structural reforms) as this maximises the stabilisation impact of 
limited budgetary resources; 
– co-ordinated so that they multiply the positive impact and ensure long term budgetary sustainability. 
(2) It should mix revenue and expenditure instruments 
In general, discretionary public spending is considered to have a stronger positive impact on demand in the 
short-run compared with tax cuts. This is because some consumers may prefer to save rather than spend, 
unless the tax cuts are limited in time. Taking the different situations of Member States into account the 
following measures could be considered. 
– Public expenditure has an impact on demand in the short-term. Measures that can be introduced quickly 
and targeted at households which are especially hard hit by the slowdown are likely to feed through almost 
directly to consumption, e.g. temporarily increased transfers to the unemployed or low income households, 
or a temporary lengthening of the duration of unemployment benefit. This can also be done through 
frontloading public investment in projects which could benefit SMEs and could support long-term public 
policy goals such as improving infrastructure endowments or tackling climate change; 
– Guarantees and loan subsidies to compensate for the unusually high current risk premium can be 
particularly effective in an environment where credit is generally constrained. They can help bridge a lack of 
short-term of working capital which is currently a problem for many companies; 
– Well designed financial incentives for speeding up the adaptation of our economies to long-term 
challenges such as climate change, including for example incentives for energy efficiency; 
– Lower taxes and social contributions: lower social contributions paid by employers can have a positive 
impact on job retention and creation while lower taxation of labour income can support purchasing power in 
particular for low wage earners; 
– Temporary reductions in the level of the standard rate of VAT can be introduced quickly and might 
provide a fiscal impulse to support consumption. 
(3) It should be conducted within the Stability and Growth Pact 
Budgetary policy should be conducted within the Stability and Growth Pact, so as to provide a common and 
credible framework for policy. The 2005 revision of the Pact allows better account to be taken of cyclical 
conditions while strengthening medium and long-term fiscal discipline. The resulting framework is more 
(Continued on the next page) 
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demanding in good times, it affords more flexibility in bad times. Extraordinary circumstances combining a 
financial crisis and a recession justify a co-ordinated budgetary expansion in the EU. It may lead some 
Member States to breach the 3% GDP deficit reference value. For Member States considered to be in an 
excessive deficit, corrective action will have to be taken in time frames consistent with the recovery of the 
economy. This is fully consistent with the procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact which guarantee that 
the excessive deficit will be corrected in due time, ensuring long-term sustainability of the budgetary 
positions. The Stability and Growth Pact will therefore be applied judiciously ensuring credible medium-
term fiscal policy strategies. Member States putting in place counter-cyclical measures should submit an 
updated Stability or Convergence Programme by the end of December 2008. This update should spell out 
the measures that will be put in place to reverse the fiscal deterioration and ensure long-term sustainability. 
The Commission will then assess the budgetary impulse measures and stability and convergence 
programmes based on updated forecasts and will provide guidance on the appropriate stance, relying on the 
following objectives: 
– ensuring the reversibility of measures increasing deficits in the short term; 
– improving budgetary policy-making in the medium-term, through a strengthening of the national 
budgetary rules and frameworks; 
– ensuring long-term sustainability of public finances, in particular through reforms curbing the rise in age-
related expenditure. 
(4) It should be accompanied by structural reforms that support demand and promote resilience 
While the most immediate impact on growth and jobs in the short run needs to come from a monetary and 
fiscal stimulus, a comprehensive recovery plan also needs to encompass an ambitious structural reform 
agenda tailored to the needs of individual Member States, and designed to equip them to emerge stronger 
from the crisis. In part, this is because some structural reforms can also contribute to bolstering aggregate 
demand in the short term. Moreover, structural reforms are necessary to address some of the underlying root 
causes of the present crisis, as well as to strengthen the economy's adjustment capacity needed for a rapid 
recovery. 
A resilient, flexible economy helps mitigate the adverse impact of an economic crisis. The Lisbon Strategy 
has already strengthened the European economic fundamentals. Appropriately tailored, Lisbon strategy 
structural reforms could be an appropriate short-term policy response to the crisis as they strengthen 
economic resilience and flexibility. Member States should consider the following measures: 
– Supporting consumer purchasing power through improved market functioning: policies that improve the 
functioning of key markets can help sustain demand by helping bring down prices, thus supporting the 
purchasing power of households; 
– Addressing immediate competitiveness problems. In Member States with inflation and competitiveness 
problems measures need to be taken urgently that reinforce the link between the wage setting mechanism 
and productivity developments; 
– Supporting employment and facilitating labour market transitions: today's prime labour market challenge 
is to avoid wasteful labour shedding by industries temporarily affected by short-term demand disturbances. 
To that end, more flexibility in working time arrangements or enhanced employment services could help; 
– Reducing regulatory and administrative burdens on businesses. Such reforms help increase productivity, 
and strengthen competitiveness. Measures that can be implemented rapidly include continuing efforts to 
reduce the time to start up a business. 
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Revenue side measures typically play some role in 
all Member States that are addressing the crisis. 
The importance of these measures is closely 
related to the overall scope of counter-cyclical 
fiscal measures that Member States governments 
have already put in place. This scope naturally 
differs among Member States, since some have 
been hit early by the crisis, or since in some 
Member States domestic problems additionally 
impact on the economic situation, whereas some 
Member States have only recently seen their 
economies affected. Moreover, given that the 
financial system remains fragile and the impact of 
the crisis on the real economy crisis is still 
unfolding, Member States' revenue side measures 
to counter the crisis are also still evolving. Due to 
the evolving nature of the crisis and of Member 
States' policy interventions, an overview of the 
specific measures taken is notoriously incomplete, 
and an evaluation of the impact of the specific 
measures taken by individual Member States is 
clearly premature. A meaningful in-depth analysis 
of a comparative nature needs to be postponed to a 
later date, when a clearer picture of the measures 
undertaken and data on their consequences become 
available. An extensive overview of revenue side 
policies taken in 2008, including those in response 
to the crisis, is provided in Annex II. 
5. SELECTED TOPICS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN 
REVENUE SYSTEMS 
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5.1. CHOICE OF SELECTED TOPICS 
The final section of this report considers several
topics that represent important developments of
revenues systems and that are particularly relevant
for policy making. These topics include the 
employment friendliness of European revenue 
systems, the adoption of flat taxes by some
Member States, and tax competition. The selection 
is not meant to imply that other aspects that are not
treated are less relevant for policy making. Future 
issues of the ARR will address other equally 
relevant topics related to the efficiency, equity, 
administration and revenue stability aspects of 
revenue systems. 
5.2. THE EMPLOYMENT FRIENDLINESS OF
EUROPEAN REVENUE SYSTEMS 
The tax burden on labour is on average very high
in Europe, although substantial differences across
Member States exist. This heavy tax burden has
been considered by some observers as one of the
factors behind the unsatisfactory European
employment performance over recent years, in the 
form of high unemployment rates, low
participation rates and low numbers of hours 
worked. (20)  Such outcomes constitute a loss of 
human capital, create social tensions and make it 
difficult to finance European welfare states,
particularly in the context of ageing societies. In 
response to this challenge, the EU, as part of the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, has set
ambitious targets to improve the labour market
performance, and adjusting European revenue
systems is a key measure towards this end.
(20) However, other significant factors are also often suggested: 
the effect of a minimum wage and the low flexibility on the 
labour market. The importance of high tax burdens for
unsatisfactory labour market outcomes has been stressed by
Prescott (2004). Other authors, such as Pissarides (2007)
and Blanchard (2004), have questioned this claim or the 
welfare implications. Kessing and Konrad (2006) and
Alesina et al. (2006), among others, have pointed out the 
importance of different labour market institutions, in 
particular collective wage setting, in this context. Gordon
(2006) provides an overview of the US-Europe 
comparison.
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The tax burden on labour is composed of several
elements. First, employers have to pay payroll 
taxes and/or employers' social security 
contributions. Second, employees have to pay
social security contributions on their wage
income. (21) Finally, the labour income is subject
to the personal income tax. These different taxes 
and social security contributions constitute the 
different components of labour taxation, and they
can be summed up to give the aggregate tax wedge
due to labour taxes. (22) It is also often referred to
as the average effective tax rate (AETR). An 
overview of these tax wedges in the Member 
States is given in Table A1.4 in the statistical
(21) Contrary to taxes, social security contributions (whether 
paid by the employer or employee) give right to individual 
benefits. Therefore, only to the extent to which the link 
between contributions and benefits in such social insurance 
schemes is not actuarially fair, i.e. the extent to which the 
contributions are disproportionately high, the contributions
actually constitute a tax. Given that it is very difficult to 
isolate the tax component in the various social security 
contributions paid in the different Member States, the
standard approach is to include the full amount in the 
measure of the tax burden.
(22) The so-measured tax wedge on labour may also be 
considered incomplete, because it does not consider the 
importance of consumption taxes such as the VAT and 
others. Consumption taxes reduce the value of wages for
the worker and therefore also increase the wedge between 
the value of gross and net wages for the worker.
annex (section 7), and in Graph 5.1. It illustrates 
the high tax burden on labour showing the
substantial incentive problems that arise in some
Member States from these high levels of average 
tax levels. 
Similarly, marginal effective tax rates (METRs) 
indicate the tax burden on additional earnings. (23) 
Graph 5.3, Graph 5.4, and Graph 5.5 provide an
overview of the METRs that a single worker is 
facing when earning 67%, 100%, and 150%,
respectively, of the average wage. Such measured
marginal tax wedges on labour remain high in 
most EU countries and contrasts with that of non-
EU OECD countries, where the total tax wedge is 
substantially lower on average than in the EU, see 
European Commission (2008c). 
(23) The METR expresses how many cents of an additionally 
euro earned have to be paid in taxes and SSCs or are 
foregone as a consequence of reduced in work benefits.
The additional net earnings from the additional Euro are 
thus 1-METR. The details of the methodology used to
calculate the METRs are decribed in Carone et al. (2003).
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Another way to measure the tax-burden on labour
is the so-called implicit tax rate on labour (ITR on
labour). In contrast to the tax wedge, it gives a
picture of the average tax burden on labour across 
all income classes and family types and therefore
compliments the AETRs and METRs. The ITR on 
labour is based on the classification of the taxes by
economic function as described in section 3.3 and 
calculated as the ratio of taxes and social security 
contributions on employed labour income to total
compensation of employees see European 
Commission (2008a) for a detailed description.
Graph 5.2 provides an overview over the
dispersion of the tax burden on labour as measured 
by the ITR on labour. 
The effects of taxes on labour market outcomes
have been extensively studied. See Pissarides
(1998) and Bovenberg (2006) for useful
summaries, and Nickell (2006) and Arpaia and
Carone (2004) for empirical evidence. (24)  
Alongside these analytical and empirical 
contributions, several policy proposals on how to
reduce the high tax burden on labour have been 
(24) There is clear evidence that an increased tax burden on 
labour has negative effects on aggregate employment in the
short run. The effects in the long run are more debated with 
some studies finding no clear effect, whereas others claim 
substantial negative effects also in the long run.
brought forward over recent years. These
proposals can be grouped into two categories that
may be appropriately combined. Tax shifting 
proposals, as the first kind of common suggestions,
usually consider the aggregate tax burden on 
labour and suggest alternative tax bases to which
the tax burden can be shifted. Such tax bases need
to be broad - to avoid excessive rates and the
related distortions - and stable - to assure revenue 
collection. Several potential bases have been
suggested, in particular consumption, capital,
polluting goods, property, inheritances and wealth. 
Graph 5.3: METR at 67% AW, single worker, 2007
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Of such tax shifting policies, the shift from labour 
to consumption has probably been the policy that 
has seen at least some implementation over recent 
years. Such a policy to rely more heavily on
consumption taxes (increasing VAT) and reducing
labour taxes (typically in the form of reduced SSCs 
or payroll taxes) was pursued in the context of the
2007 tax reform in Germany which increased VAT 
by three percentage points while using about one
third of the proceeds to lower social security 
contributions. The recent reforms in the Czech 
Republic and Bulgaria also involved simultaneous
changes of income (or SSCs) and indirect taxes. 
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Graph 5.4: METR at 100% of AW, single worker, 2007
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Source: Commission services
Graph 5.5: METR at 150% of AW, single worker, 2007
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Consumption taxes leave savings untaxed and are 
thus conducive to capital accumulation and 
growth. Recent work by the Commission (cf.
European Commission 2008c) shows that tax
shifting from labour taxes to consumption taxes
actually can have positive effects on employment
and growth. However, such effects tend to be 
modest in size and cannot serve as substitutes for
more appropriate structural reforms. Moreover,
such tax shifting may have adverse equity effects 
and the timing and the magnitudes of such policies 
need to be carefully assessed, to avoid inflationary
pressures. In particular, given the current
macroeconomic situation and concerns about the
purchasing power of low-income households,
further reform steps of this kind may currently not 
be advisable, unless accompanied by appropriate 
compensation of low income earners and transfer
recipients. 
The increase in tax revenue from capital may 
indicate that some tax shifting to capital may have
actually taken place (c.f. the discussion in section 
5.3), although this remains difficult to establish
given the importance of the cyclical component of
tax revenue from capital. This option also appears 
to be increasingly problematic for the reasons 
discussed in section 5.3. Also, capital taxes are 
levied on a smaller base than labour taxes, 
reducing the scope for this kind of tax shifting.
Although the size of the tax base also limits the tax 
shifting potential of environmental taxes, these are
often named as the preferred alternative because of
the potential double dividend, see section 3.4. 
However, despite the ongoing rhetoric and popular
perception, environmental taxes have seen their 
importance reduced in the EU, cf. Graph 3.15. 
Lower energy prices, if sustained, are, however, 
increasing the room to rely more strongly on
environmental taxation. Property taxes are an
alternative basis that appears to be a valid
alternative, mainly because of the efficiency 
properties of such taxes. Moreover, such taxes are
excellent sources of revenues, because they 
potentially allow the introduction of benefit 
taxation at the local level. Finally, inheritance and 
wealth taxes are quantitatively insufficient to 
provide a broad alternative to labour taxes, and
their efficiency and equity effects also require
close examination. 
Graph 5.6: Relative METR of low income worker (67% AW) to high income worker
(150% of AW), single workers, 2007
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Besides these various suggestions for tax shifting
to reduce the aggregate tax burden on labour, and 
thus more or less across the board for all workers, 
a second set of policy changes has focussed more 
on how to distribute the tax burden across different
types of workers by changing the progressivity of 
the tax schedule. As is evident from Graph 5.6,
Member States place quite different relative 
METRs on different types of workers, and the 
question regarding how to optimise these 
individual burdens to achieve better aggregate 
employment outcomes has been pushed to
forefront. This ratio between the METR of a low 
income may be seen as a proxy measure of
progression (see also OECD (2007)). (25)  
(25) A frequently used local measure of tax progressivity is the
ratio of the marginal tax to the average tax for a given 
income level. Since the average tax is typically different
for any two income levels, the ratio of the two METRs
does not directly relate to such local progressivity 
measures, but nevertheless gives an indication of the 
relative marginal taxes faced by low and high income
earners. Global measures of tax progressivity consider how 
the entire distribution of income is changed through the tax 
system. However, to calculate such measures, the tax (and 
benefit) schedule needs to be complemented with data on
the distribution of income, which raises several conceptual
and data availability issues. 
In this context it is also interesting to consider how 
the METR of low and high income earners have
evolved in the Member States over recent years. 
This evidence is presented in Graph 5.7. It appears
that Member States have been moving in quite 
different directions since they can be found in all
four quadrants of Graph 5.7. Thus, while in some
Member States high and low income workers face
higher METRs (BE, CZ, GR, PT, UK), in others 
both face lower METRs (DE, DK, ES, FR, LU, 
PL). Similarly, while in some Member States the 
high income earners have seen their METRs 
reduced and the low income earners increased 
(AT, FI, SK) in other Member States the METRs 
of low income earners has been reduced while the 
METRs of high income earners has gone up (HU,
SE). It should be stressed, however, that these 
changes cannot be interpreted in isolation, but need
to be considered against the existing METR levels. 
Graph 5.7: Change (pp) in METRs at low (67% AW) and high (150% AW) income,
single workers, 2001-07
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Box 5.1: Recent adjustment in labour taxes and SSCs in the Member States
Austria granted tax allowances on commuting and reduced unemployment insurance contributions. It also 
raised by one year to 57 the age limit for the relief of these contributions. 
Belgium extended the basic tax-allowance and reinforced the 'work bonus', consisting of a digressive 
reduction of individual social security contributions in favour of the lowest-income workers. It also 
introduced tax allowances on professional expenses to support R&D. 
As described in box 2, Bulgaria introduced flat tax and modified the share of social security contributions in 
favour of the employer in (from 65% to 60% for the employer and up from 35% to 40% for the employee). 
Cyprus extended the basic tax free allowance. Moreover, the reform package presented in 2008 envisages 
seven phased increases in contribution rates on insured income, by 1.3 pp each time, every 5 years from 
2009. 
In the Czech Republic a major tax reform was enacted, see box 2. 
Denmark extended the basic tax-free range in 2008 and introduced (under certain conditions) lump-sum tax 
reduction for 64 years old tax-payers and a basic personal allowance for old-age pension recipients who 
wish to work. It also increased the earned income tax credit. From 2009, the income level threshold for the 
third tax bracket (out of four) will be raised. 
Estonia reduced the personal income flat tax rate from 22% to 21% in January 2008. 
Germany further reduced SSC in the form of unemployment insurance contributions, but SSC remain under 
upward pressure from sickness insurance contributions (which until now are not directly controlled by the 
government). 
Hungary abolished the supplementary tax refund and the simplified the tax refund. 
Malta extended the basic tax-free range in 2008. 
Spain reduced social security contributions for self-employed workers in specific sectors (e.g. the textile 
sectors) and for employers offering permanent contracts. Social security contributions paid by employers 
and employees were also cut in and Spain also enacted a 400 Euros tax break in the income tax.  
Finland granted tax allowances on earned income and on a second house for work purposes. The income tax 
of wage earners was reduced by raising the allowance on earned income and by relaxing the income tax 
scale. 
In France, the government has proposed the introduction of a conditionality clause over the reduction of 
social security contributions on low-wages employees in order to ensure that companies and sectors fulfil 
their obligations in terms of pay negotiations. One of the aims of the measure is to inject some dynamism to 
the social partners' negotiations on pay and to keep under control and rationalise the evolution of the 
statutory minimum wage.  
In Italy, a flat tax rate of 10% for the part of the wage linked to productivity or extra hours worked was 
introduced on an experimental basis from the second half of 2008, applying to private sector employees 
only. 
Latvia has introduced tax allowances to compensate groups that are negatively affected under the flat tax 
scheme. 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Additional graphs in the appendix provide an 
overview of the full METR profiles in the Member 
States for a single worker. Contrary to the METRs 
at given wage levels provided in Graph 5.3, Graph
5.4, and Graph 5.5, these METR profiles also
contain the disincentive effects arising from the
withdrawal of benefits. These profiles underline 
the substantial differences between the Member 
States with respect to the disincentives to work 
imposed by the tax and benefit system. This
regards the levels as well as the structure of these
disincentives. They also show that in some 
Member States these profiles have changed 
substantially since 2001, either over a specific
range, or over the entire profile. Substantial 
reductions over the entire income range can be
observed in France, Poland and the Slovak
Republic from 2001 to 2007. In Sweden, the 
METRs were reduced for all wage levels above 
approximately 40% of AW. METRs were reduced
in Finland for low wage levels (below 44% of
AW). In Greece and Ireland increases in the 
METRs could be observed, and in Germany, the 
METRs were reduced at very low income levels 
(between 11% and 36% of AW) and, increasingly,
at medium and high income levels. In Estonia and
Latvia, modest reductions can be observed for all
single workers earning more than approximately 
20% of AW since from 2005 to 2007. Over the
same period, METRs decreased at very low 
income levels, below approximately 55% of AW,
whereas they increased above approximately that
value in Lithuania.
Box (continued) 
In Lithuania the personal income tax rate was reduced to 15 per cent (including employment income) as
from 1 January 2009, at the same time direct 6 per cent pre – tax health insurance contributions instead of 
allocating 30 per cent share of personal income tax to Compulsory Health Insurance Fund were introduced. 
The procedure of application of tax-exempt amount was also changed: basic tax exempt amount now is
applied only for employment income and is increased for low-income persons and gradually reduced for 
middle-income persons. Additional tax exempt amount for parents growing up children was also increased,
depending on the number of children.  
The Netherlands modified SSCs in favour of the employer. They also raised the earned income tax credit
along with tax rebates for the second earner and a reduced tax credit for earners in households with children.
The Netherlands slightly increased the tax rate for earnings between € 17,579 and € 31,589, while the tax 
wedge of low-wage workers was moderately increased
In Portugal, in view of the entry into force of the new Labour Code, a general reduction of employers'
social security contributions on open-ended contracts is planned, along with an increase in social security
contributions paid on fixed-term contracts. Moreover, social security contributions paid by employers will
be reduced by 50% during 3 years in the case of former self-employed workers who are offered a permanent 
contract. This incentive applies only for hires carried out in the 6 months following the entry into force of
the new Labour Code. 
Sweden introduced an earned income tax credit 2007, that was raised in 2008 and in 2009. Employers’ SSC 
on wages paid to the youth was halved in two steps in 2007 and 2009. The employers’ SSC on wages paid to
the 26-64-year olds was reduced from 32.42% to 31.42% in January 2009. SSC for self-employed was also
reduced by one percentage point in January 2009. Payroll tax for the employed or self-employed older than
65 years was abolished in two steps in 2007 and 2008. The lower state income tax threshold was raised in
2009. 
In Slovenia, the decline in the payroll tax continued in 2008 and the tax will be completely eliminated in
2009. It also introduced an income dependent tax relief as a response to relatively high inflation in 2007.
The UK increased the personal allowance to compensate individuals affected by changes introduced in the
number and level of tax brackets.
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Thus, for a full analysis of the discrete decision 
dimensions of taking up work, the benefit systems 
also needs to be considered. Particularly high
disincentives to work exist for several specific 
groups that originate in the tax and benefit
systems. These groups are, in particular, low 
income workers, single parents, and second 
income earners and the specific disincentives for 
these groups need to be targeted through 
appropriate analysis and reforms. Such
disincentives relate to the incentives for 
unemployed to take up a job (unemployment trap),
the disincentives to join the labour force (inactivity
trap), and the disincentive to increase working 
hours and effort for those who already have a low
income job (low wage trap). A good indicator of 
Graph 5.8: Contributions of taxes to inactivity trap, transition from inactivity to work
(66% AW), single worker, 2007
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the latter is the METR faced by a low income 
worker as displayed in Graph 5.3. 
Analogous indicators that measure the discrete 
disincentives individuals are facing when 
considering a transition from unemployment to 
employment (unemployment trap), or from 
inactivity to employment (inactivity trap), have 
also been constructed, cf. Carone et al. (2004). 
These indicators measure the percentage of the 
additional revenues that the individual foregoes 
due to increased taxes and social security 
contributions and the withdrawal of benefits in the 
process of a transition from inactivity or 
unemployment to employment. (26)This multiple 
perspective is well in line with the recent literature 
on optimal labour taxation, see e.g. Saez (2002) 
and Immervoll et al. (2004), which has pointed to 
the importance of considering the extensive margin 
(whether to work or not) and the intensive margin 
(how many hours to work) and have derived 
results how these margins may be optimally 
balanced. Thus, the employment friendliness of 
labour taxation must also be considered against the 
extensive margin. Finally, it should be stressed that 
a trade-off between the tax disincentives at the 
extensive (that is disincentive to take up a job) and 
the intensive margin (increasing work hours or 
effort) exists, which needs to be taken into account 
when designing an employment-friendly tax 
system. 
Recent work by the Commission on tax and 
benefits, cf. Carone et al. (2008) underlines that 
unemployed or inactive workers face substantial 
adverse incentive effects to take up work in many 
Member States. There are sizeable unemployment 
and inactivity traps. (27) These disincentives to 
(26) The low wage trap also needs to consider the phasing out 
of family and housing benefits. However, these are 
typically phased out at a specific threshold, which only by 
coincidence may be given at a given wage level, such as 
the 67% of the average wage used above. The METRs 
provided in Graph 5.3 ignore such potential coincidences 
and only report the METR due to taxes, in-work benefits 
and SSCs. 
(27) The inactivity trap is made up of the withdrawal of benefits 
(social assistance, housing benefits, family benefits) and 
the tax wedge experienced when working, which is made 
up of income taxes, in-work benefits, and SSC. The 
unemployment trap considers the withdrawal of 
unemployment benefits instead of social assistance, but 
otherwise takes into account the same components. The 
inactivity and unemployment traps considered here concern 
work are composed of several components. On the 
one hand, there are the various benefits, such as 
social assistance or unemployment benefits, but 
also family and housing benefits, which an 
individual has to give up when moving into 
employment. On the other hand, taxes and SSCs 
also contribute to the disincentives by reducing the 
net take home pay from taking up employment. 
For informed policy choices it is important to 
disentangle these various components. Thus, the 
importance of revenue systems for these 
disincentives can be assessed by considering to 
what extent taxes, potentially also including earned 
income tax credits as a specific form of in work 
benefits administered through the tax system, and 
social security contributions play a role in EU 
Member States for these disincentives. This gives 
an indication of the scope that governments have 
by using the instrument of appropriately designed 
tax reforms to reduce these disincentives. By 
considering the development of the various 
components of the inactivity and unemployment 
trap over recent years one can also gather 
information on how changes of revenue systems 
have impacted on the disincentives to move into 
employment. (28)  
The decomposition of the inactivity trap with 
respect to benefit reductions on the one hand and 
taxes and SSCs on the other hand, cf. Graph 5.8, 
reveals that the tax and SSC disincentives to work 
are substantial in some Member States. These 
Member States may consider reducing these 
disincentives through appropriate tax reforms. 
The lower panel of Graph 5.8 displays that 
reductions in tax and SSCs have substantially 
contributed to the reduction of the inactivity traps 
in Slovakia, and Sweden. They have provided 
small contributions to a reduction in Hungary, 
Finland, Denmark and Poland. On the other hand, 
they have worsened the trap in Italy, Greece, and 
the Netherlands. They have reduced the inactivity 
trap in the Czech Republic and Ireland but the trap 
a transition from inactivity or unemployment to a job 
paying 67% of AW. 
(28) It should be observed, however, that the contribution of 
taxes and social security contributions to the overall METR 
at a given wage level can also change over time due to 
factors such as changes in the wage distribution or through 
inflation resulting in fiscal drag in the context of 
progressive income tax schedules. 
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Graph 5.10: Contribution of taxes to unemployment trap, 2007
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
DE BE AT LV PL UK LT IT HU CZ FR GR PT EE DK MT FI ES SI LU CY NL IE SK SE
%
Tax and SSC Benefit withdrawal
Source: Commission services
Note: Transition from unemployment to work at 67% AW, single worker
nevertheless widened due to the development of 
benefits. 
Graph 5.10 illustrates the role played by taxes and
SSCs for the unemployment trap. Just as in the 
case of the inactivity trap, there are several
countries where the contribution of the revenue 
system to the trap is sizeable. Thus, appropriate tax
reforms can provide a significant contribution to
Graph 5.11: Components of unemployment trap (67% AW), Changes 2001-2007 
(percentage points)
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the needed improvements in labour supply 
incentives. 
Finally, the lower panel of Graph 5.10 shows that 
revenue systems, i.e. taxes and SSCs also have 
played a role in reducing the unemployment trap in 
Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, and France. 
They have played a more minor role in the 
reductions in Denmark and Poland. In Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
they played a positive role, but could not over-
compensate the negative effects of benefit 
changes. In Italy, Greece, Spain and Austria they 
increased the unemployment trap. In the UK they 
increased the trap, but this was overcompensated 
by benefit changes, so that overall a slight 
reduction in the unemployment trap could be 
observed 
Member States where the component of taxes and 
SSCs play a major role in the inactivity or 
unemployment trap need to consider appropriate 
reforms of their revenue systems aimed at reducing 
this trap. Of course, such reforms aimed at 
reducing the inactivity and unemployment traps 
need to take into account the necessity for 
compensating tax increases to balance the 
government budget with the associated negative 
incentive effects from those compensating tax 
increases. These efficiency costs must be balanced 
with the gains from reducing the inactivity and 
unemployment traps. Nevertheless, the 
comparative evidence suggests that some Member 
States, where taxes and SSCs contribute 
substantially to high inactivity and unemployment 
traps, can engineer efficiency-enhancing tax 
reforms that reduce these traps substantially. In the 
context of ageing populations and the challenge to 
meet the ambitious Lisbon employment targets, the 
concerned governments need to move forward in 
this direction. 
5.3. THE ADOPTION OF FLAT TAXES BY SOME 
MEMBER STATES 
In 2008 Bulgaria and the Czech Republic joint the 
group of hitherto 5 Member States (EE, LT, LV, 
RO, SK) that have introduced so-called flat tax 
schemes, bringing the total number of EU Member 
States operating a flat tax scheme to 7. (29)  Within 
the EU, all flat tax countries belong to the group of 
recently acceded Member States. 
A flat tax scheme typically consists of a single 
marginal tax rate that is applied at any income 
level exceeding some basic tax free allowance. (30)  
There can be, and there are, substantial differences 
between the various flat tax regimes that have been 
introduced in many countries over recent years, 
including the flat tax schemes of several Member 
States. These differences refer in particular to the 
basic tax free allowance (which may again vary 
according to family status or the number of 
children), the flat marginal tax rate on income 
exceeding the basic allowance and the 
determination of the tax base. Moreover, the 
complementary design of SSCs as well as the 
corporate tax regimes may be quite different. 
Because SSCs continue to be non-proportional due 
to ceilings or progressivity, and because these 
contributions are often quite important in countries 
having adopted a flat tax structure, effective 
taxation on labour is often far from being flat in 
practice. 
Supporters list several advantages of flat tax 
schemes. First, flat taxes seem particularly 
attractive because their proponents propose low 
levels of tax rates. However, while many flat tax 
rates observed in practice are characterised by 
relatively low rates, this is not by itself a 
characteristic of a flat tax scheme. It is very well 
possible to have an income tax scheme with 
different marginal tax rates that are all lower than 
the single rate of a flat tax scheme. More 
importantly, critics of flat taxes have pointed to the 
problem that low income earners – who already 
often have difficulties in the labour market – may 
actually see their marginal tax rate increased in flat 
tax scheme, given that they are likely to earn just 
(29) The original flat tax proposal by Hall and Rabushka 
actually referred to a tax scheme that applies a tax rate to 
businesses cash flows and to labour income at the same 
rate, with a basic, potentially family status-dependent, 
allowance for wage income. Such a scheme basically 
amounts to an expenditure tax. While still being discussed, 
in practice no country has implemented a tax system based 
on the Hall-Rabushka proposal. 
(30) In principle, flat tax scheme can be implemented without a 
basic allowance. In practice this is rarely the case. In the 
EU only the Bulgarian flat tax introduced in 2008 does not 
provide a tax free allowance. Outside the EU only Georgia 
has adopted a flat tax without a basic allowance. 
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above the basic allowance, and this is often the 
range where marginal taxes are higher under flat 
taxes compared to traditional non-flat schemes. 
Second, flat taxes are attractive because they are 
transparent. Transparency is indeed a distinctive 
feature of the flat tax, notably because each worker 
knows about her marginal tax rate (something
more difficult to assess in a progressive tax 
system). An important related argument for flat
taxes is their alleged superiority in terms of tax 
administration and compliance costs for
individuals and businesses. Flat taxes are easy to
administrate because they are usually accompanied 
by a removal of most (complex) tax deductions
from the tax base to replace them with a general 
tax allowance. Graph 5.12 illustrates that the 
former tax systems in Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic were placing an administrative burden on
businesses that was substantially above the
European average, so that the argument of tax 
simplification is likely to have been an important 
driver behind the recent introduction of flat tax rate
schemes in these Member States. (31)  However,
complexity of tax systems and administrative 
burden do not only depend on the tax schedule, but
(31) While the administrative burden measure used in Graph 
5.12 provides suggestive evidence, it needs to be
interpreted with care, as the indicator only captures one 
particular dimension of the tax system. 
also on the definition of the tax base, as well as on
the procedural requirements set up by the tax 
administration. Ivanova et al. (2005) find no 
evidence that the Russian flat tax reform of 2001 
reduced complexity. On the other hand, 4 out of
the 5 Member States that had already introduced a
flat tax scored below the European average in the
ranking of administrative burden imposed by the 
tax system on individuals and firms in 2007
displayed in Graph 5.12. It will thus be very 
interesting to see whether the introduction of flat
taxes in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic will 
reduce the administrative burden of paying taxes
significantly in these countries. 
Proponents of the flat tax also claim that so-called 
"Laffer-curve" effects from the introduction of flat
taxes will increase tax revenues. (32)  Tax revenues 
have actually increased in some countries after the 
flat tax has been introduced - albeit not in all of 
them – but research has not found Laffer effects or
sizeable labour supply effects (cf. Keen et al.
(2008)). It seems that a large part of the increased 
revenue was due to the fact that the introduction of
(32) Named in 1978 after economist Arthur Laffer, the Laffer
curve concept states that tax rates and tax collection are
linked by an inverted U-curve relationship. If one country 
is on the right-hand side of the peak, then reducing tax
rates shall increase revenues (thanks to more economic 
activity). 
Graph 5.12: Administrative burden of tax systems for mid-sized company, 2007
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the flat tax at a rate that was lower than the rates 
that prevailed before was generally accompanied 
by stricter rules to combat tax fraud and improve 
compliance. The analysis of Ivonova et al. (2005), 
for example, concludes that this has been a key 
channel that made the Russian flat tax reform 
successful. Thus, increases in tax revenues may be 
rather due to higher compliance than to increased 
labour supply. 
The introduction of a flat tax system is also 
frequently regarded as a signal to foreign investors 
that a country is engaging in business-friendly 
policies. Thus, flat tax reforms may play a role to 
improve the position of a country in the 
competition for international direct investments 
vis-à-vis competing countries. Of course, as more 
countries have been adopting a flat tax system the 
signalling function of such tax reforms has been 
increasingly eroded, and its benefits may be 
questioned under current conditions where flat tax 
schemes have proliferated substantially across the 
world, cf. Table A1.3 in the statistical annex which 
provides an overview of the flat tax schemes that 
have been implemented in 17 countries since 
1994. (33)  
The introduction of a flat tax system also impinges 
on the long run growth potential of an economy. In 
particular, the associated change in the marginal 
tax rates for high incomes and in tax progressivity 
affects incentives for investment, entrepreneurship, 
risk taking and human capital formation which are 
all important determinants of growth. If the flat tax 
scheme reduces progressivity, this will by itself 
increase human capital formation incentives. On 
the other hand, the reduction of the top marginal 
income rate will make investment in capital more 
attractive, so that investment in human capital may 
become relatively less attractive compared to the 
alternative investment in physical capital. Reduced 
progressivity may also reduce risk-taking as 
progressive taxation can serve as an insurance 
device against risk. Similar considerations may 
apply to the decision to become an entrepreneur 
itself, but in this case, the positive effects of 
reduced marginal tax rates at high incomes may 
prevail. This is at least underlined by some 
empirical evidence from the US (cf. Gentry and 
(33) Further information and analysis on flat taxes can be found 
in Nicodème (2007). 
Hubbard (2000)). On the other hand, Fossen 
(2008) finds that a reduction in tax progressivity 
tends to reduce self employment in Germany. 
Thus, there are a number of dynamic effects 
related to the introduction of a flat tax that will 
have repercussions on the long run growth 
performance of the economy. However, at this 
stage, more empirical research on these dynamic 
effects of flat taxes is necessary for a sound 
judgement. Of course, these will also depend on 
the respective designs of flat tax schemes. 
Reforms towards flat taxes are not neutral in terms 
of redistribution. The distributional effects 
obviously depend on the details of the specific flat 
tax scheme. However, in general, flat tax reforms 
tend to favour the lower-end and top-end classes of 
revenues whilst increasing the tax burden on the 
middle-class. These distributional implications 
have to be taken into account when contemplating 
the move to, and the design of, a flat tax scheme 
and each government will have to make its own 
value judgement regarding the equity-efficiency 
trade-off associated with the move to a flat rate 
scheme. (34)  
Given the rapid proliferation of flat taxes across 
the new Member States, and elsewhere, it is not 
surprisingly that similar policy proposals have also 
surfaced in many of the old Member States. Until 
now, however, they have not gathered sufficient 
support for implementation. The recent simulation 
study by Fuest et al. (2008) illustrates that a mature 
and sizeable welfare state has either little to gain 
from a move to a flat tax, if the flat tax is designed 
in such a way that the degree of inequality is kept 
constant. Intuitively, such an equality-preserving 
reform requires a high basic allowance and a high 
marginal flat tax rate, which reduces potential 
efficiency effects. On the other hand, if a flat tax is 
constructed to keep the current basic allowance 
and total tax revenue constant, the transition to a 
flat tax that has small efficiency gains but implies 
substantial redistributive effects at the expense of 
the middle class and in favour of high income 
earners. These results underline the problematic 
equity effects of flat taxes in more extensive 
welfare states which can also explain the political 
(34) Of course, this holds as well for tax reforms that do not 
consider a move to a flat tax. 
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opposition faced by flat tax proposals in countries 
characterised by extensive welfare states. 
The stark contrast with the wave of adoption of flat 
taxes in the recently acceded Member States as 
well as in other non-EU transition economies may 
not only be explained by the higher importance of 
raising revenues in mature welfare states. 
Additional advantages from increased tax 
compliance and/or reduced administrative burdens 
are likely to be systematically different between 
these groups of countries. These potentially 
positive effects of flat tax systems are likely to be 
greater in transition economies where there may be 
substantial challenges regarding the governance of 
public administration, or where tax advisory 
services and the tax administration are not as 
developed as in the old Member States. 
5.4. TAX COMPETITION 
Increased economic integration with the associated 
higher mobility of several important tax bases 
makes it potentially more difficult to collect taxes 
from these mobile tax bases. This has fuelled fears 
of erosion of the overall revenues, and of an 
undesired shift of the tax burden from mobile to 
immobile factors of production, mainly labour 
(particularly unskilled workers), and of a reduced 
ability of revenue systems to contribute to the 
achievement of income redistribution objectives. 
The international competition for these mobile tax 
bases arises not only for pure fiscal reasons of 
revenue generation. Additionally, some of these 
mobile bases, in particular physical capital 
investments or skilled labour, also generate rents 
for the immobile factors, such as land or immobile 
unskilled workers. This reinforces the competitive 
pressures on governments to compete for these 
mobile bases. 
Several observations point to the conclusion that 
competition for internationally mobile tax bases is 
increasingly shaping tax policy in the EU and 
beyond. As is evident from Graph 5.13, statutory 
tax rates of corporate taxes have been falling 
continuously in the EU over recent years and there 
is mounting evidence for the existence of tax 
competition for internationally mobile physical 
capital, as well as for accounting profits. Similarly, 
countries appear to take cross-border interactions 
in the form of internationally mobile cross-border 
shoppers into account when deciding on indirect, 
in particular excise taxes. (35)  Thus, governments 
in the EU and beyond appear to increasingly take 
the international dimension of their tax policy 
decisions into account. 
However, the view that increased economic 
integration and the associated increased 
competition between governments for 
internationally mobile tax bases has dramatically 
altered the composition of government revenues 
and reduced its capacity to finance the welfare 
state is so far not fully supported by the data. 
While capital can be considered a quite mobile tax 
base, according to available aggregate figures, 
taxation has not been shifted massively from 
capital to labour or consumption. In particular, 
while there has been a strong and ongoing EU-
wide decline in statutory corporate income tax 
rates, revenues from capital taxation, including 
corporate taxation, have not been eroded so far, 
and recent figures even show a further increase in 
the importance of corporate tax revenues as 
measured in % of GDP, cf. Graph . 
(35) Evidence on tax competition for internationally mobile 
capital is provided by Devereux et al. (2008), Huizinga and 
Laeven (2007), among others. Evidence on tax competition 
for cross border shoppers is found by Egger et al. (2005). 
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Several explanations have been put forward for 
this finding. First, base broadening efforts may 
have partly compensated the reduction in tax rates.
Second, globalisation may have increased 
profitability and hence tax revenues, for any given 
tax rate. This is related to the observation of an
increased share of profits as % of GDP over recent 
years. Third, policy initiatives such as the EU 
Code of Conduct on Business Taxation adopted in
1997 may have reduced harmful tax practices. 
Fourth, increased incorporation incentives due to 
reduced corporate taxes may have resulted in
increased tax revenues from corporate income but 
reduced revenues from personal income taxation
(see de Mooij and Nicodème (2008)). Member 
States assessing the budgetary effects of corporate 
tax reforms need to be aware of the foregone 
revenues from personal income taxes that arise 
from increased incorporation incentives of planned 
corporate tax reform. Moreover, the reductions in
corporate tax rates may imply that the corporate 
tax is losing its function as a "backstop" for 
personal income taxes. (36)   
(36) The backstop function of the corporate income tax refers to 
the possibility that entrepreneurs may avoid tax liabilities
by declaring personal income as corporate income. This
backstop function is potentially an important reason that 
limits further reductions in corporate tax rates. On the other 
The importance of increasing competition for 
mobile tax bases raises the question of appropriate
policy responses not only at the national level, but 
also at the international level. National policies 
have tried to adjust to these circumstances through
various measures, in particular by reducing the tax
burden on mobile bases. The answer to the 
questions of whether and how to regulate tax 
competition internationally, or at least at the
European level, typically depends on the view one
takes on the effects of tax competition. Some
observers see tax competition as a beneficial 
disciplining device that will make governments 
more efficient. Others see the reduced revenue
raising capacity as a threat to the welfare
enhancing role of government, in particular to its
capacity to redistribute income. However, even if 
one believes in the beneficial effects of tax
competition on government activity, it should also 
be noted that tax competition occurs between
countries of given characteristics, which are often 
hand, as ownership is becoming increasingly international, 
this effect may be weakened, cf. Fuest and Hemmelgarn 
(2005). Of course, it could also be that this function is 
becoming less important as a consequence of increased 
efforts against fraud and evasion, which could be an 
additional explanation for falling corporate tax rates.
Graph 5.13: Statutory corporate tax rates (incl. local taxes and surcharges), EU-27
(arithmetic average)
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not possible to change, such as country size. (37)  
The given characteristics may structurally put 
certain countries at a disadvantage. For example, 
small countries will, ceteris paribus, typically be in 
an advantaged position vis-à-vis large countries, 
see Bucovetsky (1991) or Kanbur and Keen 
(1993). Moreover, competition among
governments is likely to fail in many instances, 
because governments are typically active in sectors
where private activity typically does not work very 
well. The market failure that was the original 
reason for government intervention will typically
reappear in the competition between governments
(cf. Sinn (1997)). Furthermore, even if 
governments are not fully benevolent, the welfare 
effects of reduced tax competition will depend on
the relative effects that this will have on the 
wasteful activities (a negative effect) and on the 
increase in public good provision and 
redistribution (a positive effect), cf. Edwards and 
Keen (1996). Finally, some economists maintain
that capital should not be taxed and thus see the 
reduction in corporate tax rates as efficiency 
enhancing. However, such results are typically
based on models that have too restrictive 
assumptions, cf. the extensive discussion of this by
Banks and Diamond (2008). However, a recent 
empirical
(37) Note that this situation is different from classic market 
competition where firms usually can choose freely their
 study by Arnold (2008)) finds that
corporate taxes are particularly harmful for 
organisation, financing, technology, etc. so all firms are 
competing on a level playing field.
growth. 
Tax competition in corporate taxes can take the 
form of rate-cut cum base-broadening reforms. An
important aspect that is frequently overlooked in 
this context is that base broadening is not always
innocuous. In the domain of corporate taxation 
many provisions that reduce the tax base such as 
loss carry-forwards and a proper deduction of costs 
are important features of the tax regulations to
preserve efficiency of economic decisions taken by
firms. Similarly, some other aspects of corporate
tax codes, such as privileged treatment of
investments in R&D, for example in the form of
immediate or accelerated depreciation schemes,
serve the purpose of internalising the positive
external effects that are often generated by such
activities. Broadening the base of corporate 
taxation thus may carry the danger of reducing
efficiency, if such efficiency-preserving provisions
in the corporate tax code are repealed. There are
concerns that base broadening policies, often 
driven by attempts to restrict firms' possibilities to
relocate profits to low tax countries, can get into 
conflict with the objective of efficient investment
and financing decisions. There exists a tension 
Graph 5.14: Tax revenue from corporate income tax and total tax revenue from capital
and business income, EU-27
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60 
e base 
broadening elements that do not substantially 
istort investment and financing decisions. 
between the base broadening to increase efficiency 
and defend tax revenue and the objective of 
reducing distortions of firms' decisions. When 
considering base broadening corporate tax reforms, 
one needs to carefully assess the various 
alternatives and restrict the policy to thos
d
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Table A1.1:
2006
Total taxes (including SSC) 39,6 40,3 40,5 40,5 41,0 40,7 39,8 39,2 39,1 39,0 39,3 39,9 39,9 0,4
Indirect taxes 13,3 13,4 13,6 14,0 14,3 14,0 13,7 13,6 13,6 13,7 13,8 13,9 13,7 0,6
VAT 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,8 7,0 7,0 6,9 6,8 6,8 6,8 6,9 7,0 6,9 0,4
Excise duties & consumption taxes 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 2,9 2,8 2,7 3,0 -0,3
Other product taxes incl. import duties 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,7 1,8 1,6 0,2
Other taxes on production 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,3 0,3
Direct taxes 12,4 12,8 13,2 13,6 13,8 14,0 13,6 13,0 12,8 12,7 13,0 13,5 13,2 1,1
Personal income taxes 9,2 9,3 9,2 9,7 9,8 9,9 9,7 9,4 9,3 8,9 9,0 9,2 9,4 0,0
Corporate income tax 2,0 2,4 2,7 2,6 2,7 2,8 2,6 2,3 2,2 2,4 2,7 3,0 2,5 0,9
Other 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 0,1
Social security contributions 13,8 14,1 13,8 13,0 13,0 12,8 12,7 12,6 12,8 12,7 12,6 12,6 13,1 -1,3
Employer SSC 7,5 7,7 7,6 7,4 7,3 7,3 7,3 7,2 7,4 7,3 7,2 7,2 7,4 -0,3
Employees SSC 4,7 4,7 4,6 4,2 4,2 4,1 4,0 4,0 4,0 3,9 3,9 3,9 4,2 -0,9
Self and non-employed SSC 1,6 1,7 1,7 1,5 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 -0,2
Note:  GDP-weighted averages. Totals may be affected by rounding. SSC: social security contributions.
EU-27: Total taxes (incl. social security contributions) and tax structure, % of GDP, 1995-2006
pp change
1995-20062000 20011995 1996 1997
Average 
1995-2006
Source: Commission services.
2002 2003 2004 20051998 1999
Table A1.2:
Tax structure in EU-19, % GDP, 2007, OECD classification
Austria 11,5 12,6 14,1 2,7 0,6 0,4
Belgium 11,2 16,7 13,7 0,0 2,2 0,0
Czech Republic 10,9 8,7 16,1 0,0 0,4 0,0
Denmark 16,3 29,3 1,0 0,2 1,9 0,0
Finland 12,9 16,9 11,9 0,0 1,1 0,0
France 10,8 10,4 16,2 1,2 3,5 1,5
Germany 10,6 11,3 13,2 0,0 0,9 0,0
Greece 11.3* 7.5* 11.1* 0.0* 1.4* 0.0*
Hungary 14,7 10,0 12,9 0,6 0,8 0,2
Ireland 11,7 12,5 4,9 0,2 2,8 0.0*
Italy 10,6 14,8 13,1 0,0 2,1 2,6
Luxembourg 10,1 12,9 10,2 0,0 3,6 0,0
Netherlands 11,4 11,1 13,8 0,0 1,2 0,2
Poland 12.8* 7.0* 12.2* 0.3* 1.2* 0.0*
Portugal 14,0 9,5 11,7 0,0 1,2 0,1
Slovak Republic 11,5 5,9 11,9 0,0 0,4 0,0
Spain 9,6 12,6 12,2 0,0 3,0 0,2
Sweden 12,8 18,7 12,6 2,7 1,2 0,1
United Kingdom 10,7 14,4 6,8 0,0 4,6 0,0
EU 15 11.8* 13.8* 11.1* 0.5* 2.2* 0.3*
EU 19 12.0* 12.6* 11.5* 0.4* 1.9* 0.3*
Note: GDP-weighted averages. Totals may be affected by rounding. SSC: social security contributions.
Source: OECD
Taxes on property Other taxesTaxes on goods and services Taxes on income SSC
Taxes on payroll 
and workforce
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Table A1.3:
Flat taxes in the EU and elsewhere
Basic allowance*
Flat tax
adopted Before** After** 2008 Before** After** 2008
Bulgaria 2008 10–24 10 10 10 10 10 Eliminated
Czech Rep. 2008 12–32 15*** 15 24 21***** 21 Substantial increase
Estonia 1994 16–33 26 21 35 26 22 Modest increase
Latvia 2004 10–35 25 25 25 25 15 Increase by 67%
Lithuania 1994 18–33 33 24 29 29 15 Substantial increase
Romania 2005 18–40 16 16 25 16 16 Increase
Slovakia 2004 10–38 19 19 25 19 19 Substantial increase
Russia 2001 12–30 13 13 30 35 24 Modest increase
Ukraine 2004 10–40 13 15 30 25 25 Increase
Georgia 2005 12–20 12 12 20 20 20 Eliminated
Kyrgyz Rep. 2006 10–20 10 10 20 10 10 Unchanged
Macedonia 2007 15–24 12 12f 15 12 10 Unchanged
Kazakhstan 2007 5–20 10 10 30 30 30 Substantial increase
Mongolia 2007 10–30 10 10 15 and 30 10 and 25 10 and 25**** Substantial increase
Iceland 2007 36.72 and 38.72 35,72 35,72 18 18 18 Modest increase
Albania 2007 1–20 10 10 20 20 10 Increase
Montenegro 2007 15–23 15 15k 15/20 9 9 Increase
***** CIT rate was reduced to 20% in 2009 and is scheduled to be further reduced to 19% in 2010.
Source: Keen et al. (2008) and Commission services
*** This rate applies to income inclusive of the 35% employers’ SSC. The implied rate on income exclusive of these contributions —
comparable with other rates in the table — is 23.1%.
**** Threshold for the higher rate has been substantially increased.
Personal Income Taxes rates Corporate Income Taxes rates
* Change due to the introduction of flat tax.
** Rates relate to year before and after flat tax adoption.
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Change2001-08 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Change
2001-08
Austria 46,9 47,1 47,4 48,1 47,9 48,1 48,5 48,9 2,0 42,9 43,1 43,5 43,9 43,1 43,5 44,1 44,5 1,6
Belgium 56,7 56,3 55,7 55,4 55,4 55,4 55,5 55,9 -0,8 50,7 50,5 49,6 48,9 49,2 49,1 49,6 50,2 -0,5
Bulgaria 40,4 39,6 39,0 38,9 38,9 35,4 36,5 n.a. n.a. 35,9 35,2 35,0 34,9 35,3 31,1 32,3 n.a. n.a.
Cyprus 20,9 17,3 18,5 18,6 13,6 14,1 13,9 n.a. n.a. 17,0 17,2 18,5 18,6 11,9 11,9 11,9 n.a. n.a.
Czech Republic 42,6 42,9 43,2 43,5 43,8 42,6 42,9 43,5 0,9 41,3 41,5 41,7 41,9 42,1 40,1 40,5 40,1 -1,2
Denmark 43,6 42,6 42,6 41,3 41,4 41,3 41,3 41,2 -2,4 40,5 39,8 39,8 39,3 39,3 39,3 39,3 39,0 -1,5
Estonia 39,7 42,2 42,5 41,4 41,6 40,2 40,1 n.a. n.a. 37,4 40,2 40,7 38,9 39,8 38,4 38,7 n.a. n.a.
Finland 46,4 45,9 45,0 44,5 44,6 44,1 43,7 43,5 -2,9 41,4 40,9 40,0 39,4 39,5 38,9 38,2 38,2 -3,2
France 49,8 49,8 49,8 49,9 50,1 50,2 49,2 49,3 -0,5 47,6 47,4 45,0 42,4 41,8 44,5 44,4 44,5 -3,1
Germany 53,0 53,5 54,2 53,2 52,4 52,5 52,2 52,0 -1,0 47,7 48,1 48,8 47,8 47,3 47,4 47,4 47,3 -0,4
Greece 38,1 37,7 37,7 39,5 40,4 41,2 42,3 42,5 4,4 35,1 34,3 34,4 34,9 34,8 35,4 36,7 37,7 2,6
Hungary 54,0 53,7 50,8 51,8 50,5 51,0 54,4 53,9 -0,1 48,1 48,2 44,5 44,8 42,9 42,9 45,9 46,6 -1,5
Ireland 25,8 24,5 24,2 25,0 23,5 23,1 22,3 22,7 -3,1 17,3 16,7 16,2 20,0 16,8 16,3 15,0 15,7 -1,6
Italy 46,0 46,0 45,0 45,4 45,4 45,2 45,9 46,5 0,5 42,7 42,7 41,1 41,4 41,7 41,5 42,0 43,0 0,3
Latvia 42,7 42,9 42,2 42,5 42,2 42,9 42,4 n.a. n.a. 41,2 41,4 40,8 41,2 40,9 41,8 41,1 n.a. n.a.
Lithuania 45,2 44,6 43,4 43,7 44,4 46,3 43,0 n.a. n.a. 42,2 41,2 39,5 40,0 41,0 43,9 41,3 n.a. n.a.
Luxembourg 37,0 34,2 34,7 35,1 35,9 36,5 37,5 37,2 0,2 31,2 29,0 29,3 29,6 30,2 30,6 31,4 31,2 0,0
Malta 23,4 24,1 23,3 23,6 23,9 24,5 23,6 n.a. n.a. 17,0 17,7 17,4 17,6 17,8 18,4 18,6 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 37,2 37,4 37,1 38,8 38,9 44,4 44,0 44,8 7,6 38,9 39,1 40,0 40,8 41,6 40,6 40,2 41,4 2,5
Poland 42,9 42,9 43,1 43,3 43,6 43,7 42,8 39,8 -3,1 41,8 41,7 41,9 42,2 42,4 42,5 41,6 38,7 -3,1
Portugal 36,4 36,6 36,8 36,8 36,3 36,3 37,4 37,4 1,0 32,2 32,3 32,4 32,4 31,8 31,7 32,6 32,6 0,4
Romania 47,9 47,3 46,2 45,8 44,0 43,7 43,4 n.a. n.a. 45,2 44,6 43,4 42,9 42,4 42,2 41,8 n.a. n.a.
Slovak Republic 42,8 42,5 42,9 42,5 38,3 38,5 38,5 38,9 -3,9 41,3 40,8 40,9 39,6 35,3 35,6 35,6 36,1 -5,2
Slovenia 42,3 42,5 42,5 42,6 42,4 44,0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 41,0 41,1 41,1 41,1 39,4 39,8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain 38,8 39,1 38,5 38,7 38,9 39,1 38,9 37,8 -1,0 35,3 35,7 34,7 35,2 35,5 35,9 35,6 33,8 -1,5
Sweden 49,1 47,8 48,2 48,4 47,9 47,9 45,4 44,8 -4,3 47,8 46,8 47,0 47,1 46,5 46,0 43,3 42,5 -5,3
United Kingdom 31,8 31,9 33,3 33,4 33,5 33,9 34,1 33,0 1,2 28,0 28,1 29,6 29,7 29,9 30,4 30,8 30,0 2,0
EU-27 44,9 45,0 45,4 45,2 44,9 45,1 44,8 n.a. n.a. 41,3 41,4 41,3 40,7 40,4 40,7 40,6 n.a. n.a.
Source: OECD and Eurostat
Note: Change 2000-08 in percentage points, 2008 provisional values, AE: Average earnings
Table A1.4:
Total tax wedge on labour (including employers' social security contributions)
Total tax wedge (average rate, including employers' SSC), single 
person without children, 100% of AE
Total tax wedge (average rate incl. employers' SSC), single person 
without children, 67% of AE
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%
Source: All graphs are based on data from the joint
OECD-EC METR project. BG and RO are not 
available. METR profiles include the withdrawal 
of social assistance, housing benefits, family 
benefits and the effects of in-work benefits,
income taxes and SSCs. 
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ANNEX 3
2008 Tax measures 
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
AT 9 9
BE 9 9
BG 9 9 9
CY 9
CZ 9 9
DK
EE
FI 9 9 9
FR 9
DE 9 9 9
EL 9 9
HU 9
IT
IE 9 9 9 9
LV 9 9 9 9 9 9
LT 9 9 9
LU 9 9
MT
NL 9 9
PL 9
PT 9 9
RO 9 9
SK 9
SI 9 9 9 9
ES 9 9 9 9
SE 9 9 9 9
UK 9 9 9
Source: Commission services and EPC. 
Consumption
Summary of nature of measures taken in response to the financial crisis
Table A3.1:
Country Explicit measures Implicit measures
Labour Capital Consumption Labour Capital
9
9
9
The tables in this section list the tax measures taken by Member States since January 2008 to counteract 
the effects of the economic crisis. The measures include two categories: (a) those explicitly taken to
counteract the effects of the crisis and (b) those that are not explicitly taken to counteract the crisis but
whose effects may act against the effects of the crisis. The table only includes measures that have been 
adopted or introduced, not those under discussion. 
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Table A3.2:
Detailed list of tax measures taken
Country Title of the reform Date of adoption Description
Austria Temporary increase 
of tax credit
4-juin-08 Finance Committee of Austrian Parliament (Finanzausschuss) decided a
temporary increase in tax credit for commuting expenses and the kilometre
allowance to compensate for increasing petrol prices. The measure takes
effect from 1 July 2008 to 31 December 2009.
Austria VAT rate oct-08 From December 2008, VAT rate for pharmaceuticals is reduced from 20% to
10%. In addition, supplementary payments for overtime work become tax free
up to 86 Euros/months.
Austria Economic growth 
package
30-oct-08 Increase of limits on income tax deductible savings from 1000 Euro to 1200
Euro for savings in Bausparkassen., which are supposed to provide the
acquired liquidity to SMEs.
Belgium Reduction social
contributions on low-
income
Implemented October
1st, 2008
Personal social contributions are lowered by up to € 32 euro a month for low
income households.
Belgium Tax plan 2008 Adopted on 
29 May, 2008
- Retroactive from January 2008, an exemption for additional personnel
applies for companies with less than 11 employees. The exemption amounts
to EUR 3,720 for each additional employee if gross wage does not exceed
EUR 90.32 per day or EUR 11.88 per hour. 
- From 1st July 2008, the amount of wage tax withheld would be increased
from 25% to 50% for salary paid to researchers employed under an R&D
program.
From tax year 2009, the basic allowance for income not exceeding EUR
15,220 is increased from EUR 4,059 to EUR 6,150. For income greater than
EUR 15,220 but lower than EUR 15,365, the allowance will increase by the
difference between the taxable income and EUR 15,220.
- From January 2009, costs incurred by employers for providing transport for
personnel, between home and work and costs of SMEs for safety measures
are deductible at 120%.
Bulgaria Amendments to the 
Law on Local Taxes 
and Fees
The amendments entered 
into force as of 1 January
2008; Published in 
Official Gazette on 21 
December 2007
- The alternative lump-sum tax for small individual entrepreneurs becomes a
local tax. 
- From January 2008, the rates for the taxes and fees covered by each
municipality shall be fixed within new limits set by the law.
Bulgaria Amendments to the 
Corporate Income 
Tax Law
Published in Official 
Gazette on 21 December
2007
- With retroactivity from January 2007, the withholding tax rate on dividends is
reduced from 7% to 5%, the exemption on withholding tax for payments made
by permanent establishments located in a tax treaty partner is abolished, the
penalty for hidden distributions is decreased from 50% to 20%, the thin
capitalization rules are amended to exclude interest expenses capitalized into
the value of an asset, the threshold for depreciable assets is increased from
BGN 500 (approximately EUR 256) to BGN 700 (approximately EUR 358).
Asset of lower value are expensed immediately, expenses for marketing
surveys, business plans, strategies cannot be treated as depreciable
intangibles.
- The provisions for the Parent-subsidiary directive are modified to exempt
dividends from 95% to 100% from corporate income.
- New detailed provisions are introduced for the transformation of closely held
companies into sole property companies.
- Advanced payments for taxpayers with sales below BGN 200,000 (about
EUR 102,300) and new taxpayers are exempted from advanced payments.
Bulgaria Amendments to
social security
contributions for 
2008
Budget of the Public 
Social Security for 2008 
published in the Official 
Gazette on 28 December
2007
Budget of the Public 
Social Security for 2009 
published in the Official 
Gazette on 23 December
2008
Changes to the social security contributions from 1 January 2008:
- The maximum monthly social security base is increased from BGN 1,400
(approx. EUR 716) to BGN 2,000 (approx. EUR 1023). The minimum social
security base for self-employed is increased from BGN 220 (approx. EUR
112) to BGN 240 (approx. EUR 123). 
- The share of employer and employee in social security contributions is
changed from 65/35 to 60/40.
Changes to the social security contributions as of 1 January 2009: 
- The maximum monthly social security base is preserved at its 2008 level of
BGN 2,000 (approx. EUR 1023). The minimum social security base for the
self-employed is increased from BGN 240 (approx. EUR 123) to BGN 260
(approx. EUR 133).
- The share of the employer and the employee in the social security
contributions is 60/40, excluding the pension contributions, for which the
distribution was changed to 10-to-8.
(Continued on the next page)
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Bulgaria Amendments to the 
Personal Income Tax 
Law
Entered into force as of 1 
January 2008; Published 
in Official Gazette on 28 
December 2007
- Progressive personal income tax rates reaching a top marginal rate of 24%
is replaced by a flat 10% tax, without allowance (with few exceptions).
- Fixed deductions to business and independent services income are
decreased.
- 10% fixed deduction for management fees is abolished.
- Introduction of a 10% capital gain on immovable property.
- Withholding tax on dividends to resident individuals is reduced from 7% to
5%
- Withholding tax rate on insurance income is decreased from 15% to 10%.
Bulgaria Amendments to the 
VAT law
Entered into force as of 1 
January 2008; Published 
in Official Gazette on 28 
December 2007
- VAT on partial advance payment made prior to the chargeable event is due
only on the part of the taxable amount corresponding to the payment.
- Abolition of the zero rate on intermediary services supplied outside the EC.
Bulgaria Amendments to the 
Corporate Income 
Tax Law
Enter into force as of 1 
January 2009;
Published in Official 
Gazette on 5 August 
2008
- New rules for inbound and outbound dividends to/from companies and other
entities resident in the EEA, which are identical to the rules for domestic
dividends (i.e. no withholding tax).
Bulgaria Changes to
inheritance
allowance
Adopted with the 2009 
budget law
- Lower inheritance allowance of BGN 250,000 (approx. EUR 127,800) to
BGN 70,000 (approx. EUR 35,800).
Bulgaria Changes to
Corporate Income 
Tax Law
Adopted with the 2009 
budget law
- Abolition of the employment aid scheme for depressed regions.
Bulgaria 2009 State Budget of
the Republic of 
Bulgaria Law
Adopted with the 2009 
budget law
Measures aimed at stimulating the economy, as well as a number of
measures to minimize the eventual effects of the financial crisis, grouped in
three packages: 
- "Economic Activity": public investment program. 
- "Market Flexibility“: access to credit for small SMEs. 
- "Flexibility of Social Networks": labour market flexicurity.
Cyprus Amendments to the
VAT law
- Reduction of the VAT rate from 15% to 5% on specific goods and services
such as confectioneries and entrance fees to cultural and sport events –
19/10/2007.
- Reduction of VAT rate from 15% to 5% on importation of items of
archeological value of CN code 9706.00.00 – 30/5/2008.
- Reduction of VAT rate from 8% to 5% on the supply of services by school
canteens – 25/7/2008.
Cyprus Reduction tax on 
heating
 Reduction in the excise duty levied on heating oil – 1.11.2008. 
Czech Republic Major changes to 
corporate and 
individual taxation
Government submitted to 
the lower chamber of the 
Parliament an 
amendment to the 
Income Tax Law. The 
changes would generally
apply from
1 January 2009.
- Thin capitalization: scope extended to credits and loans provided by
unrelated parties. In addition, de minimis rule for annual financial costs of up
to CZK 1 million is abolished.
- Participation exemption - capital gains: scope of exemption of capital gains
extended to include capital gains derived by qualifying parent companies
resident in other Member States. 
- Cross-border donations: donations to eligible bodies resident in other
Member States, Norway and Iceland would be deemed tax-deductible, subject
to conditions.
- PIT rate. The flat 15% personal income tax rate would not be reduced to
12.5%, as originally envisaged.
- Personal tax credits: basic tax credit (CZK 24,840) and credit for dependent
spouse (CZK 24,840) would not be reduced to CZK 16,560 from 1 January
2009. 
- Social security contributions paid by employees reduced by 1.5 percentage
points from 8% to 6.5% of the gross employment income.
- Exemption of capital gains from securities: would apply to any securities (as
opposed to "transferable securities and securities issued by collective
investment undertakings"); and only direct participation in the capital or voting
rights of the issuer (as opposed to "direct or indirect participation") would be
relevant for claiming the exemption.
Denmark No fiscal measures announced
Estonia No fiscal measures announced
(Continued on the next page)
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Denmark No fiscal measures announced
Estonia No fiscal measures announced
Finland 2009 budget bill tax 
proposals
January 20009 To boost economic growth and employment, taxes on earned income will be
eased by:
Decrease rates of the national income tax table by 1 or 1.5 percentage points,
depending on the bracket;
- Indexation of approximately 4% to the bracket amounts in the income tax
table; and 
- New employment income deduction,
- Increased pension income allowances, both national and municipal.
- Maximum household allowance increased from EUR 2,300 to 3,000.
- VAT on foodstuffs reduced from 17% to 12% as of 1 October 2009. Taxes
on tobacco will be raised by 10% (cigarettes) or 25% (hand-rolled cigarettes).
Tax on alcohol will be increased by 10%.
France Bill on Economic
Modernization
Adopted on 
23 July 2008
(a) Micro-enterprise tax regime: monthly or quarterly withholding tax would
apply at the rate of 13% for income from the sale of goods and at the rate of
23% for income from services.
(b) Inward expatriates: entitled to an income tax exemption of 30% of taxable
French income for the first 5 years, provided that all applicable exemptions do
not exceed 50% of the taxpayer's total taxable income.
(c) Foreign source dividends, interest and royalties would be exempt from
income tax up to 50% of their amount.
(d) Capital companies would be able to make an election to be taxed as
personal companies (i.e. société de personnes) under conditions.
(e) Transfer of shares of SAs and SARLs subject to registration duty of 3%
(instead of 5%).
France Local business tax 
exemption
Announced Exemption from local business tax for investments made from mid-October
2008 until 1st January 2010.
France Finance bill 2009 Adopted by the Council of
Ministers on 
30 September 2008
From 1 January 2009:
- Personal income tax rates for 2008 income unchanged at 5.5%, 14%, 30%
and 40%. However, the corresponding income brackets would be indexed and
uniformly increased by 2.9%, as would various deductions and thresholds
- Capital gains from occasional sale by private individual of quoted and
unquoted shares in companies which are subject to corporate income tax, are
tax-exempt if the amount of the proceeds from sales of securities sold
throughout a given year by the fiscal household is below EUR 25,730.
- Global cap for the tax relief resulting from incentive measures for investment
in the French Overseas Departments.
- Progressive abolition of the annual minimum lump-sum tax for companies.
- Extension to 2009 of the exceptional windfall tax on oil companies.
- Net wealth tax brackets uniformly indexed and increased by 2.9%.
- Brackets, thresholds and deductions applicable to gift and inheritance tax
indexed and increased by 2.9%.
Germany Federal Cabinet 
approves economic
stimulus package
5-nov-08 - Introduction of declining-balance depreciation at a rate of 25% for movable
fixed assets acquired or produced after 1 January 2009 and before 31
December 2010
- increased thresholds for accelerated depreciation of the cost of movable
fixed assets.
- Maximum credit for services supplied by self-employed persons for
household repairs increased to 20% of EUR 6,000 (i.e. maximum EUR 1,200)
- Incentives for buyers of environmentally friendly cars.
- Non-tax measures (infrastructure projects, energy efficiency in buildings, and
loans for SMEs).
Germany Reduction in SCC Adopted on 07.10.08 From January 2009 the rate to the unemployment insurance lowered from
3.3% of income to 2.8%. From July 2010 the rate will be raised again from
2.8% to 3%.
Greece Tax reform 2008 Enacted on 
2 October 2008
- 10% withholding tax for distributed profits from Greek corporations (those
falling within the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 2003/123/EC will be
exempt).
- Inbound dividends from foreign corporations to resident individuals bear a
10% final tax (before PIT).
- Capital gains from listed shares subject to a 10% withholding tax.
- director's fees to board members of a corporation subject to final withholding
tax at a rate of 35%.
- percentage of advance corporate tax is increased to 80%;
- gradual reduction by 1 percentage point per year of the corporate income tax
rate for the years from 2010 to 2014. This bring the current rate of 25% to
20%.
Hungary Special Energy Tax 10-nov-08 Special energy tax on energy suppliers, from 1st January 2009 until 1 January
2011 (tax base is same as the CIT base and the rate is 8%).
Italy Decree Law n.
93/2008 (converted
into Law n. 126/2008)
Provisions to support household purchasing power. The Decree envisages
scrapping property tax (“ICI”) on houses used as primary residences and
outlining new ways to renegotiate mortgage loans taken out for the purchase
and renovation of primary residences (an agreement between the Treasury
and the Bank Association was signed on 19 June 2008). Specific aids to
sustain low income persons have been envisaged through the use of a “social
card”.
Italy Art. 83 Decree n.
112/2008 converted 
into Law n. 133/2008
Stronger measures to fight tax evasion; resulting savings earmarked for tax
cuts.
Italy “Robin Hood” tax
(art. 81.16 Decree
Law n. 112/2008)
The so-called “Robin Tax” is and additional corporate income tax charged on
oil, gas and electricity industries in relation to extra profit generated from
exceptional high oil prices. It is forbidden for those firms to shift the tax on
price under the surveillance of Energy Authority.
(Continued on the next page)
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Italy Art. 83 Decree n. 
112/2008 converted 
into Law n. 133/2008
Stronger measures to fight tax evasion; resulting savings earmarked for tax
cuts.
Italy “Robin Hood” tax 
(art. 81.16 Decree 
Law n. 112/2008)
The so-called “Robin Tax” is and additional corporate income tax charged on
oil, gas and electricity industries in relation to extra profit generated from
exceptional high oil prices. It is forbidden for those firms to shift the tax on
price under the surveillance of Energy Authority.
Italy Decree Law n. 185
dated 28 November 
2008
- Reduction of the corporate income tax and IRAP (Italian regional tax on
business activity)
- VAT payment by the taxpayer/seller only when its effective collection has
been accomplished
- Incentives - in terms of fiscal benefits- for the return of Italian researchers
working abroad
- Tax reduction on wages linked to productivity.
Ireland Budget for 2009 
(direct and indirect
taxation)
14-oct-08 With effect from 1 January 2009:
- Payment dates for companies paying more than EUR 200,000 corporation
tax on their profits are to be brought forward in 2009. 
-  R&D tax credit increases from 20% to 25% of incremental expenditure.
- An income levy of 1% for all income up to EUR 1,925 per week (i.e. just over
EUR 100,100 per annum), and 2% on the balance above this amount (i.e.
over EUR 100,100 per year) is introduced.
- Standard tax rate band increased by EUR 1,000 for a single person, and by
EUR 2,000 for a married couple with 2 incomes.
Reduction of the annual earnings limit for tax-relieved pension contributions. 
Deposit Interest Retention Tax increases from 20% to 23% on ordinary
deposit accounts, and from 23% to 26% on life assurance policy and
investment fund payouts.
- Deemed interest to be assessed as a benefit on a loan from an employer to
an employee raised from 13% to 15% for loans other than home loans. For
home loans, the rate remains at 5.5%.
- Employee social security contribution ceiling raised from EUR 50,700 to EUR
52,000.
- Mortgage interest relief for first-time buyers. 
- Capital gains tax is to increase from 20% to 22%. 
- Standard rate of VAT of 21% increased to 21.5% in December 2008. 
- Excise duty on cigarettes increases by 50c per packet of 20. Excise duty on
a bottle of wine increases by 50c. Excise duty increases by 8c per litre of
petrol. All from October 2008.
- Motor tax rates increased by 4% for small cars and vans in the low CO2
bands, 5% increase for larger cars in the higher CO2 bands. All from 1
January 2009.
- Top rate of stamp duty on commercial property is to be reduced from 9% to
6%. 
- EUR 10 air travel tax for departures from Ireland, and EUR 2 for short flights
within Ireland, and to western parts of Britain.
- Betting tax increased from 1% to 2%.
Latvia Changes to social 
security
Adopted by Parliament on 
19 June 2008, published
in Official Gazette on 9 
July 2008. Took effect 
from 23 July 2008.
- Suspend the application of the maximum taxable base from 1 January 2009
until 31 December 2013. 
- Self-employed persons opting for simplified fixed income tax scheme must
make social security contributions if their income reaches the statutory
threshold for social security
Contributions to recognized private pension schemes and "with-profits" life
insurance premiums paid by the employer on the employee's behalf will be
deductible from the taxable base, under conditions.
Latvia Amendments to 
corporate tax law
Adopted by Parliament on 
14 November 2008. 
Became effective on 1 
January 2009
- Incentive for acquiring new machinery - the increase of the asset value for
the depreciation purposes providing investment incentives. The amendments
provide for increase of depreciation coefficient of assets up to 1.5 applicable
for 5 year-period, namely, from 2009 till 2013;
- Allowance for corporate equity (ACE)- the law provides for decreasing of
taxable income by the amount of interest payable by taxpayer in case the
increase of equity capital was financed by a loan;
- Incentive for registration of patents and trademarks (incentive for investment
in R&D) - law provides for increase of depreciation coefficient for intangible
assets up to 1,5 (likewise for new manufacturing equipment) if such
investment results in registration of patents and trademarks;
- Rollover relief for assets - law provides for corporate income tax exemption
on gains derived from alienation of assets of an enterprise, if the gains are
used for acquisition of a similar asset within 12 months period of date of
alienation.
- Abolition of 5% withholding tax imposed on payments made to non-residents
for the use of aircraft employed in international transportation.
- Extension of loss carry-forward from 5 to 8 years.
Latvia Changes to personal 
income tax
Adopted on 19 December 
2006 and published in the 
Official Gazette of 2 
January 2007. Became 
effective on 1 January
2008
- From January 2008 PIT rate on business income is reduced from 25% to
15%. 
Latvia Amendments to the
VAT law
Adopted by Parliament on 
12 December 2008. 
Became effective on 1 
January 2009
- VAT standard rate was increased from 18 per cent to 21 per cent ;
- VAT reduced rate was increased from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. From the list
of goods and services to what VAT reduced rate is applicable were deleted: 
accommodation services, subscription on radio and television, veterinary
medicaments, books, supply of water, funeral services, sewerage services, 
hairdresser services, simple renovation of housing, entrance tickets in cinema 
and sports events, the supply of the firewood and wood fuel to households. 
VAT reduced rate is applicable periodicals until the end of 2009.
(Continued on the next page)
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Latvia Changes to personal 
income tax
Adopted on 19 December 
2006 and published in the 
Official Gazette of 2 
January 2007. Became
effective on 1 January
2008
- From January 2008 PIT rate on business income is reduced from 25% to
15%. 
Latvia Amendments to the
VAT law
Adopted by Parliament on
12 December 2008. 
Became effective on 1 
January 2009
- VAT standard rate was increased from 18 per cent to 21 per cent ;
- VAT reduced rate was increased from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. From the list
of goods and services to what VAT reduced rate is applicable were deleted: 
accommodation services, subscription on radio and television, veterinary
medicaments, books, supply of water, funeral services, sewerage services, 
hairdresser services, simple renovation of housing, entrance tickets in cinema 
and sports events, the supply of the firewood and wood fuel to households. 
VAT reduced rate is applicable periodicals until the end of 2009.
Latvia Amendments to the
Excise tax law
Adopted by Parliament on
14 November and 12 
December 2008. Became 
effective on 1 January
and 1 February 2009
- The specific excise duty on cigarettes was increased from LVL 17.8 (EUR
25) to LVL 22.5 (EUR 32), the ad valorem excise – from 32.2 % to 34.5% and
an overall minimum EU excise duty (specific duty plus ad valorem duty
excluding VAT) of EUR 64 per 1000 cigarettes for most popular price
cigarettes was reached
- Excise excise duty on other smoking tobacco was increased from LVL 14
(EUR 20) to LVL 23 (EUR 32)
- Excise duty on unleaded petrol was increased from LVL 228 (EUR 322) to
269 LVL (379 EUR) per 1000 litres and the EU minimum level of EUR 359 per
1000 litres was reached (according to the Council Directive 2004/74/EC a
transitional period was set until 1 January 2011), on leaded petrol – from LVL
297 (EUR 419) to 300 LVL (423 EUR) per 1000 litres on gas oil and kerosene
– from LVL 193 (EUR 272) to LVL 234 (330 EUR) per 1000 litres and the EU
minimum level of EUR 330 per 1000 litres was reached (according to the
Council Directive 2004/74/EC a transitional period was set until 1 January
2013) as well as on liquid petroleum gases – from LVL 87 (EUR 123) to LVL
90 (EUR 127) per 1000 kg of product; 
- Excise duty on ethyl alcohol was increased from LVL 630 (EUR 888) to LVL
825 (EUR 1163) per hectolitre of pure ethyl alcohol, on beer – from LVL 1.30
(EUR 1.83) to LVL 1.45 (EUR 2) per hectolitre/degree of alcohol of finished
product, on wine and other fermented beverages – from LVL 30 (EUR 42) to
LVL 40 (EUR 56) per 100 litres.
Latvia Changes to personal 
income tax
Adopted on 12 December 
2008 and became 
effective on 1 January
2009
- From January 2009 PIT general rate is reduced from 25 per cent to 23 per
cent.
Lithuania Changes to tax laws Adopted by Parliament in 
December 2008 as part 
of measures to 
counteract the effects ot 
the economic crisis
(Became effective on 1
January 2009)
- Personal income tax rate reduced to 15% (except dividends which are
subject to 20% income tax) with an introduction of direct 6% pre – tax health
insurance contributions (instead of allocating 30 per cent share of personal
income tax to Compulsory Health Insurance Fund.).
- Application of basic tax exempt amount revised, applying it only for
employment income, also increasing it for low-income persons and gradually
reducing taking into account a level of the income of the individual. Additional
tax exempt amount for parents increased, depending on the number of
children.
- All income tax incentives were reviewed by abolishing those which were not
socially-grounded and saving-orientated.  
- Corporate income tax rate increased from 15% to 20 %.
- Corporate income tax incentive for entities which invest into essential
technological modernisation was established allowing to reduce taxable profit
up to 50 per cent by expenses incurred acquiring the property, defined in the
Law.
- Sectoral corporate income tax incentives for most agricultural entities and
credit unions were abolished. 
- Standard VAT rate increased from 18 % to 19 %. All reduced VAT rates
were abolished (with the exception of a reduced 5% VAT rate for the supply of
some pharmaceuticals and medical aids, a reduced 9% VAT rate for books
and not periodical informational publication applicable until 30 June 2009).
- Excise duty on 1000 litters of unleaded petrol increased from LTL 1116
(EUR 323) to 1,500 LTL (434 EUR), on leaded petrol – from LTL 1454 (EUR
421) to 2000 LTL (578 EUR), on diesel fuel and kerosene – from LTL 947
(EUR 274) to LTL 1140 (330 EUR) as well as on petroleum gas and gas
hydrocarbons – from LTL 432 (EUR 125) to LTL 1050 (EUR 304) per ton of
product.
- Excise duty on ethyl alcohol increased from LTL 3840 (EU 1112) to LTL
4416 (EU 1279) per hectolitre of pure ethyl alcohol as well as excises duties
on beer, intermediate products wine and other fermented beverages
increased 10-20 %. A reduced rate of duty for small breweries was abolished.
- Excise duties on tobacco products will be increased two times – in March
(the specific component of excise duty on cigarettes will increase from 79 LTL
(EUR 22,9) to LTL 95 (EUR 27,5), and the ad valorem component - from 20 %
to 25 %) and in September (the specific component of excise duty on
cigarettes will increase once more to LTL 132 (EUR 38,2) 2009.
Luxembourg Changes to company
taxation 
Law of 19.12.2008 - Corporate income tax reduced from 22% to 21%.
- Capital duty abolished from 1 January 2009. 
- Dividends paid to companies that are members of a country with which
Luxembourg shares a tax convention are exempt from withholding tax (under
certain conditions).
Luxembourg Changes to personal 
taxation 
Law of 19.12.2008
Grand-Ducal
Regulation of 9.12.2008
Finance Bill 2009
- Tax brackets are adapted linearly by 9% to inflation, whereas the current
progressive tax rates varying from 0% up to 38% would remain unchanged. 
- Tax allowances for the employed, the retired and monoparental families are
replaced by tax credits. 
- Housing: Full exemption for the interest paid on accounts with an authorized
home savings institution in Luxembourg or another EU or EFTA Member
State.
- Extension of the preferential tax treatment for the construction or renovation
of owner-occupied dwellings (increase of the threshold from € 416.667 to €
500.000 for which the reduced VAT rate of 3% is applied).
- From the 1.1.2009 VAT rate for district heating and wood for use as firewood
is reduced from 12% to 3%.
Malta Changes to the 
personal income tax
Announced (1 January
2009)
Revision of the income tax bands, including specific fiscal measures aimed to
encourage higher female participation.
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74 
Annex 3 
2008 Tax measures
Table (continued)
Luxembourg Changes to personal
taxation
Law of 19.12.2008
Grand-Ducal
Regulation of 9.12.2008
Finance Bill 2009
- Tax brackets are adapted linearly by 9% to inflation, whereas the current
progressive tax rates varying from 0% up to 38% would remain unchanged. 
- Tax allowances for the employed, the retired and monoparental families are
replaced by tax credits.
- Housing: Full exemption for the interest paid on accounts with an authorized
home savings institution in Luxembourg or another EU or EFTA Member
State.
- Extension of the preferential tax treatment for the construction or renovation
of owner-occupied dwellings (increase of the threshold from € 416.667 to €
500.000 for which the reduced VAT rate of 3% is applied).
- From the 1.1.2009 VAT rate for district heating and wood for use as firewood
is reduced from 12% to 3%.
Malta Changes to the 
personal income tax
Announced (1 January
2009)
Revision of the income tax bands, including specific fiscal measures aimed to
encourage higher female participation.
Malta Changes to
environmental taxes
Announced (1 January
2009)
Overhaul of the motor vehicle registration tax and annual circulation tax to one
based on the polluter pays principle.
The Netherlands Tax plan 2009 Announced by the 
Ministry of Finance on 16 
September 2008
- Withdrawal of planned increase of the standard VAT rate from 19% to 20%.
- Larger part of the profits of SMEs will be exempt from tax. 
- Broadening of research and development incentive scheme.
- Parental leave tax credit for working parents raised because entitlement to
parental leave is being extended from 13 to 26 weeks. 
- Tax credit for working parents will be increased.
- Measures for fuel-efficient cars.
- Threshold for quarterly VAT returns increased from EUR 7,000 to EUR
15,000.
The Netherlands Reform of the
inheritance tax
Adopted by the Council of
Ministers on 24 October
2008
- Current 28 inheritance rates would be replaced by 4 rates.
- New exemptions.
Poland New PIT rates 1-sept-08 Retroactively from 1 January 2006:
- the increase of tax-deductible costs
- the increase of tax-free amount
From 1 January 2009, there would be only two personal income tax rates, i.e.
18% and 32% (tax threshold of PLN 85,528).
Poland Amendments to
Individual Income
Tax Law approved by
government
23 September 2008,
adopted by Parliament on 
30 October 2008. To be 
ratified by President and 
enter into force on 1 
January 2009.
In September 2008, the government approved the draft law amending the
Individual Income Tax Law.
- Mandatory social security contributions and mandatory health insurance
contributions paid by a Polish taxpayer located in another Member State and
that cannot be deducted in that State may be deducted in Poland. 
- Extension of the child allowance to include foster parents and legal
guardians and children studying outside of Poland.
- Extension under conditions of the possibility to file a joint tax return by
"spouses in a marital property" 
- Exemption for income from sale of residential property if fully used for
acquiring another residential property within two years. 
Portugal Reduction in VAT
rate
Announced in end-March,
published in 27th June 
2008 to enter into force in
the 1st July 2008
- Reduction in VAT standard rate from 21% to 20%.
Portugal State Budget for 2009 
(tax incentives)
Presented to the 
parliament on 15 October
2008; approved and
published on 31st
December 2008 to enter
into force the 1st January
2009
- Multiple tax exemptions for Housing Investment Funds (Fundos de 
Investimento Imobiliario para Arrendamento Habitacional)
- New regime for urban rehabilitation (exemptions).
Portugal State Budget for 2009 
(corporate income
tax)
Presented to the 
parliament on 15 October
2008; approved and
published on 31st
December 2008 to enter
into force the 1st January
2009
- Two new corporate income thresholds with following rates: (i) 12.5% (new
rate) for the first EUR 12,500 of taxable profit and (ii) general 25% (current
rate) for taxable profit exceeding EUR 12,500.
- Reduction in the advance payments made by small and medium companies.
- Deductibility of employees’ commuting borne by the employer.
- New specific regime for deduction of additional mandatory contributions to
pension funds by insurance companies.
- Abolition of possibility to opt for the simplified tax regime (tax simplification
measure).
Portugal State Budget for 2009 
(individual income
tax)
Presented to the 
parliament on 15 October
2008; approved and
published on 31st
December 2008 to enter
into force the 1st January
2009
- Commuting expenses are no longer subject to individual income tax.
- Extension of reinvestment periods for relief from taxation of capital gains on
the sale of owner-occupied permanent residences.
- Extension of deduction of costs incurred on renewable energy equipment.
- Increase in the personal deduction for disabled taxpayers.
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Portugal State Budget for 2009 
(corporate income
tax)
Presented to the 
parliament on 15 October
2008; approved and 
published on 31st 
December 2008 to enter
into force the 1st January
2009
- Two new corporate income thresholds with following rates: (i) 12.5% (new
rate) for the first EUR 12,500 of taxable profit and (ii) general 25% (current
rate) for taxable profit exceeding EUR 12,500.
- Reduction in the advance payments made by small and medium companies.
- Deductibility of employees’ commuting borne by the employer.
- New specific regime for deduction of additional mandatory contributions to
pension funds by insurance companies.
- Abolition of possibility to opt for the simplified tax regime (tax simplification
measure).
Portugal State Budget for 2009 
(individual income
tax)
Presented to the 
parliament on 15 October
2008; approved and 
published on 31st 
December 2008 to enter
into force the 1st January
2009
- Commuting expenses are no longer subject to individual income tax.
- Extension of reinvestment periods for relief from taxation of capital gains on
the sale of owner-occupied permanent residences.
- Extension of deduction of costs incurred on renewable energy equipment.
- Increase in the personal deduction for disabled taxpayers.
Portugal State Budget for 2009 
(other taxes)
Presented to the 
parliament on 15 October
2008; approved and 
published on 31st 
December 2008 to enter
into force the 1st January
2009
From January 2009, changes in the real estate tax, the property transfer tax 
and stamp duty, leading to simplification and decrease of those taxes.
Portugal State Budget for 2009 
(value added tax)
Presented to the 
parliament on 15 October
2008; approved and 
published on 31st 
December 2008 to enter
into force the 1st January
2009
From January 2009, the reduced VAT rate of 5% is extended to: (i) safety car
seats for children; (ii) maintenance works and repair of prosthesis; and (iii)
construction works contracted in respect of properties owned by municipal
entities for the rehabilitation and urban management
- the VAT referring to unrecoverable debts higher than EUR 750 and lower
than EUR 8,000 can be deducted 
- VAT exemption may be requested in respect of sublease of industrial
properties.
- Assets granted to charities may benefit from VAT exemption.
Portugal Package of tax 
measures aimed at
minimizing the 
effects on taxpayers 
of the current
movements in the 
financial and 
petroleum markets
10 July 2008, Submission 
to parliament; approved 
and published as Law 
nº64/2008 on 5 
December
With retroactivity from January 2008:
- The reduction of Municipal Property Tax, by extending the exemption period,
cutting the maximum rates by 0.1 percentage points and establishing a
regressive exemption of the income tax allowances for housing expenses,
which can be as much as 50% for the lowest income taxation brackets,
benefiting almost one million households.
- Mandatory use of the FIFO method or the average cost method as valuation
criteria for oil stocks and the difference between the old and new methods is
subject to specific final taxation at 25%.
- The increase of the specific final tax on fringe benefits (e.g. motor vehicles
expenditures), regarding corporate and individual income tax.
Romania Emergency
Ordinance No. 
127/2008
Changes to direct
and indirect taxation
Published in Official 
Gazette on 16 October
2008 
- Temporary exemption in 2009 of capital gains from trading securities on
Romanian stock markets.
- Permanent exemption of several types of capital gains realized by non-
resident. 
- Carry forward for 1 year of capital losses by individuals.
- Increase in the cap for deductions of voluntary pension and health 
contributions from corporate and personal income.
- Retailers of petrol, diesel, kerosene, LPG and natural gas must register with 
the local tax authority. 
Slovenia Amendment to 
Corporate Income 
Tax Law
Published in Official 
Gazette on 6 June 2008,
in force from 7 June 2008
- Possibility that interest rate on loans issued between associated enterprises
could be different form published interest rate if a taxpayer proves that in
equal or comparable circumstances a loan would also be issued at an interest
rate which is different (lower/higher) than the published interest rate.-
Extension of tax relief for donations on (listed) payments to EEA residents
(provided that exchange of information is enabled).
- Exemption from withholding tax on outbound interest payments extended to
any interest paid by a bank (under conditions).
- Exemption from the withholding tax for dividends paid to recipients resident
in other Member States and/or in EEA (if there is exchange of information)
provided that the withholding tax cannot be credited in the recipient's
residence state.
- No withholding tax is levied on dividends and interest paid to pension funds,
investment funds and insurance companies which provide pension schemed
and are resident in other Member States and are resident in other Member
States provided that the withholding tax cannot be credited in the recipient's res
Slovenia Amendment to 
Corporate Income 
Tax Law
Published in Official 
Gazette on 25 July 2008,
in force from 26 July
2008
With retroactivity from January 2008:
- New investment allowance for investment in equipment or intangible assets
by companies.
Slovenia Amendment to 
Personal Income Tax 
Law
Published in Official 
Gazette on 30 July
2008,in force from 31 
July 2008
With retroactivity from January 2008:
- Increase of thresholds for the additional general allowance.
- Introduction of investment allowance for sole entrepreneurs investing in
equipment or intangible assets.
- Introduction of investment allowance for agriculture and forestry activities.
- Introduction of flat tax deduction for sportsmen.
- Introduction of tax exemption for beekeepers.
Slovenia Amendment to 
Personal Income Tax 
Law
Published in Official 
Gazette on 30 December
2008,in force from 31 
December 2008
With retroactivity from January 2008:
- Increase of investment allowance for sole entrepreneurs investing in
equipment or intangible assets.
- Increase of investment allowance for agriculture and forestry activities.
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Slovenia Amendment to 
Personal Income Tax
Law
Published in Official
Gazette on 30 July
2008,in force from 31 
July 2008
With retroactivity from January 2008:
- Increase of thresholds for the additional general allowance.
- Introduction of investment allowance for sole entrepreneurs investing in
equipment or intangible assets.
- Introduction of investment allowance for agriculture and forestry activities.
- Introduction of flat tax deduction for sportsmen.
- Introduction of tax exemption for beekeepers.
Slovenia Amendment to 
Personal Income Tax
Law
Published in Official
Gazette on 30 December 
2008,in force from 31 
December 2008
With retroactivity from January 2008:
- Increase of investment allowance for sole entrepreneurs investing in
equipment or intangible assets.
- Increase of investment allowance for agriculture and forestry activities.
Slovenia Amendments to Act
on Excise Duty on 
Fuel
Published in Official
Gazette in  December 
2008
Increases of excise duties on petroleum products.
Spain Economic package of 
November 2008
Royal Decree 1975/2008,
28 November
Employers that provide indefinite contracts to unemployed workers with
dependent children will benefit from a social security rebate of up to 1,500
euro per year for two years. This applies to all new hires through December
2010.
- Advance of the tax credit for habitual dwelling mortgages: Possibility of
receiving the Personal Income Tax credit for mortgage payments on a
monthly basis. Applicable for salaried and self-employed workers with annual
earnings of less than 33,000 euro. Implemented via a 2% reduction in
Personal Income Tax withholdings ( salaried employees) or prepayments (self-
employed). The advance is voluntary.
- Extension of the deadline for using the savings in home purchase savings
accounts: Account holders whose deadline for home acquisition is between
1.1.08 and 31.12.10 will have an extension to 31.12.10. Additional
contributions are not eligible for tax credit
- Extension of the 2-year deadline for tax exemption on the sale of the habitual
dwelling: People who acquired their habitual home in 2006, 2007 or 2008 have
Spain Measures for the 
impulse of the 
economic activity
adopted in April 
2008.
The Royal Law-Decree 
2/2008 of 21 April 2008, 
published in the Official
Gazette on 22 April 2008.
(a) Extension of the deadline for the tax prepayment due by companies.
(b) New credit of EUR 400 for individual taxpayers who obtain employment
and business income. 
(c) Extension of exemption for income derived from Spanish government
bonds for all non-residents
(d) Improved tax treatment of building refurbishment in VAT and Personal
Income Tax. Refurbishment whose cost is over 25% more than the acquisition
price (not including the land). The goal is for more projects to be eligible for a
more neutral beneficial tax scheme, improving input VAT recovery and
stimulating the construction industry. The same applies to the rehabilitation
credit allowed for the habitual dwelling under Personal Income Tax. Effective
January 2008.
(e) For a two year period, possibility to demand the extension of the lifetime of
a mortgage credit with no financial costs, no fiscal expenditures and no
registry and notary expenditures.
Spain Modification of VAT
refunds system and
elimination of wealth 
tax and other tax 
measures. With the
exception of the
modification of the 
depreciation system, 
all these measures
were foreseen in the
April package.
Act 4/2008, 23 Dec. Possibility as of January 2009 of requesting VAT refunds on a monthly basis.
So far, this return was carried out in one single payment by the end of the
year.
Elimination of the wealth tax. Its will reduce the savings distortions generated
by the tax system. It will be effective in 2008 already. 
Expansion of the R&D tax credit in the Corporate Tax: From 2008, the credit
may be applied to companies with more than 25% of their research activity in
another EU or European Economic Area country
Modification of the depreciation system in the Corporate income tax:
businesses are free to take accelerated depreciation on investments made in
2009 and 2010 in new property, plant and equipment for use in economic
activities, subject to the condition that, in the following two years, the
company's headcount remains in line with the average headcount of the
previous 12 months.
Sweden Budget for 2009 
presented to 
parliament
22-sept-08 From January 2009:
- Reduction in the corporate tax rate from 28% to 26.3%.
- A 1 percentage point reduction in the rate of social security contributions for
employees as well as self-employed, further reductions for persons aged
under 26.
- Amendment of the 3:12 rule, applicable to closely-held companies by
reducing the amount taxed as employment income.
- Introduction of an option for inventory not exceeding a value to be deducted
immediately.
- Introduction of a limitation on the interest deduction available to affiliated
companies
- Increased earned income tax credit.
- An increase in the lower tax bracket for central government income tax.
- Increase in the tax free personal allowance for taxpayers aged over 65.
- Increase in the amount of non-deductible commuting expenses from SEK
8,000 (EUR 825) to SEK 9,000 (EUR 928) for travelling between work and
home.
United Kingdom Reduction in 
corporate tax rate
avr-08 The main rate of corporation tax for the 2008 financial year is reduced to 28%.
The corporation tax rate for small companies is increased to 21%, and the
marginal relief fraction is adjusted to 7/400.
United Kingdom Tax reforms Budget 
2008-2009
avr-08 From April 2008:
- reform of the capital gains tax regime with introduction of an entrepreneurs'
relief;
- abolition of the 10% rate of income tax in respect of non-savings income;
- reduction in the basic rate of income tax from 22 pence to 20 pence;
- extension of the non-payable dividend tax credit to dividends from non-UK
resident companies, where the investor owns less than a 10% shareholding.
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United Kingdom Reduction in 
corporate tax rate
avr-08 The main rate of corporation tax for the 2008 financial year is reduced to 28%.
The corporation tax rate for small companies is increased to 21%, and the
marginal relief fraction is adjusted to 7/400.
United Kingdom Tax reforms Budget
2008-2009
avr-08 From April 2008:
- reform of the capital gains tax regime with introduction of an entrepreneurs'
relief;  
- abolition of the 10% rate of income tax in respect of non-savings income;
- reduction in the basic rate of income tax from 22 pence to 20 pence;
- extension of the non-payable dividend tax credit to dividends from non-UK
resident companies, where the investor owns less than a 10% shareholding.
United Kingdom Increase in tax-free 
personal allowance
13-mai-08 Increase in the tax-free personal allowance for taxpayers aged below 65.
United Kingdom Pre-Budget Report 24-nov-08 Temporarily reducing the VAT rate to 15% with effect from 1 December 2008
to 31 December 2009. 
Increase in alcohol and tobacco duty to offset the overall level of taxation
remains unchanged following the VAT reduction. 
Increase in tax free personal allowance for taxpayers aged below 65. 
Increase in fuel duty by two pence per litre.
Deferral of the increase in the the small companies’ rate of corporation tax.
Temporary increase in threshold at which empty property becomes liable for
business rates.
From April 2010, restriction in the income tax personal allowance for incomes
over £100,000.
From April 2011, new higher rate of income tax of 45% for incomes above
£150,000.
From April 2011, increase in national insurance contributions by 0.5% for
employees, employers and self-employed. 
Sources:  IBFD, EC, EPC, Press Reviews,
78 

 
 
 
European Commission 
 
European Economy No. 4/2009 — Monitoring revenue trends and tax reforms in Member States 
Joint EC-EPC 2008 Report 
 
 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
 
2009 — 78 pp. — 21 x 29.7 cm 
 
ISBN 978-92-79-11365-9 
DOI 10.2765/81385 
 
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: EUR 50 
 
How to obtain EU publications
Publications for sale:
● via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);
● from your bookseller by quoting the title, the publisher and/or ISBN number;
● by contacting one of our sales agents directly. 
You can obtain their contact details by linking http://bookshop.europa.eu, 
or by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758
Free publications:
● via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);
● at  the European Commission’s representations or delegations. 
You can obtain their contact details by linking  http://ec.europa.eu/ 
or by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758.
M
on
itorin
g reven
u
e tren
d
s an
d
 tax reform
s in
 M
em
ber States –
 2
0
0
8
EURO
PEA
N
 EC
O
N
O
M
Y 4|2009
KC
-A
R-0
-004-EN
-C
9
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: EUR 50
European Economy (6 issues minimum per year): EUR 160
The annual subscription runs from 1 January to 31 December of each year.
Payments to be made only to sales agents on the list (see inside backcover for details).
These are surface mail rates. For air subscription rates, please apply to the sales offi ces.
www.ec.europa.eu/economy_fi nance
Based on the mandate of the ECOFIN Council, the work program of the Working Group on the 
Quality of Public Finances (EPC-QPFWG attached to the Economic Policy Committee (EPC)) has 
identified the efficiency of tax systems as a key issue for further work. The EPC-QPFWG has decided 
that this work should, among others, take the form of an annual report.
The joint EC-EPC Annual Report on Revenues (ARR) is prepared by the Commission (jointly by 
DG ECFIN and DG TAXUD) and the EPC-QPFWG. It builds on the substantial work carried out 
by the Commission services, such as assessments of the budgetary implications of tax reforms, 
analyses on the key role of revenue systems for the sustainability of public finances and the studies 
considering their effects on employment, growth and equity and their contribution to the 
achievement of environmental policy objectives.
